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The Guarantee Clause of
Article IV, Section 4: A Study
in Constitutional Desuetude
In this Article, the author explores the "potentialities
long dormant" in article IV, section 4, of the United
States Constitution under which "both Congress and the
courts were endowed with tremendous power." The po-
tentialities to which Mr. Bonfield refers are the attain-
ment and advancement, as well as the protection, of the
individual's political and civil rights. While the fourteenth
amendment has done much to advance these goals, only
the guarantee clause, argues the author, can compensate
for the deficiencies inherent in the fourteenth amend-
ment. By using contemporary values to define the term
"republican," the author urges the Supreme Court to re-
evaluate its position, taken in past cases, that all issues
raised under article IV, section 4, are nonjusticiable. Af-
ter a thorough historical analysis of the guarantee clause,
the author concludes that its appropriate use would cure
the deficiencies of the fourteenth amendment and thus
insure the fuller realization for all Americans of those
basic precepts upon which our society rests.
Arthur E. Bonfield*
INTRODUCTION
Article IV, section 4, of the United States Constitution provides
that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the
executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against do-
mestic violence." While the latter parts of this provision have been
adequately explored,' no comprehensive consideration of the po-
tentialities long dormant in the first clause has ever been under-
* Senior Graduate Fellow, Yale Law School.
1. See, e.g., Ferguson, The Inherent Justiciability of the Constitutional
Guaranty Against Domestic Violence, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 407 (1959).
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taken. This is unfortunate, since under this portion of our funda-
mental law, both Congress and the courts were endowed with tre-
mendous power.
The hypothesis to be tested in this article is that the first clause
of section 4 has not been completely displaced by later additions
to the Constitution. As a result, it still exists as an independent and
untapped source of federal power, by which the central government
can assure the fuller realization of our society's democratic goals.
The fourteenth amendment, which was adopted 80 years subse-
quent to the guarantee, has only partially met that task. This has
been due to several serious deficiencies in its application to dep-
rivations of political and civil rights.
First, that amendment requires "state action" as a requisite for
its successful invocation.2 Although the amount of state participa-
tion necessary to constitute such action has been substantially di-
minished in recent years,' the requirement still stands as a signifi-
cant bar to the amendment's use in a multitude of situations.4 Sec-
ond, save for rare instances,5 the fourteenth amendment has been
deemed to effect solely a negative limitation on state action. That
is, it has never been construed to impose any extensive affirmative
obligations on state or local government.6 Its third defect is an in-
ability to cope with nondiscriminatory, though perhaps overly re-
strictive requirements on the ballot.' This is somewhat related to
2. "No state shall . . . ." See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278 (1913). On "state action" see generally Lewis, The Meaning
of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960), and the numerous
articles cited in EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 77-78, 1229 (1958).
3. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(state action present in the refusal to serve Negroes by a restaurant op-
erated on premises leased from a state agency); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953) (state action present if a court enforces, or awards dam-
ages for, breach of restrictive racial covenant); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948). The expansion of state action is presently one of the most
dynamic areas of fourteenth amendment law.
4. This occurs in cases where the connection between the state and in-
dividual, group, or business discrimination is insufficient to warrant a find-
ing of state action. E.g., state incorporation has not been thought sufficient
in itself to prevent such a corporation from refusing to hire Negroes. The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Lewis, The Meaning of
State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960).
5. In cases where the police failed to protect people against mob vio-
lence, see Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); Catlette
v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943). See also United States v.
Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1953).
6. For example, the obligation to see that one group of citizens does
not conspire to deprive another group of citizens of an equal oppor-
tunity to obtain the minimum requisites deemed essential to life in con-
temporary America, such as decent housing, employment and education.
7. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (a poll tax imposed on
potential voters did not violate the fourteenth amendment).
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its last disability, which is the amendment's seeming inapplicability
'to structure of state government. 8
While it is arguable that the fourteenth amendment could even-
tually encompass some of the situations presently deemed beyond
its scope, it is unlikely that it could deal with all of them, or that
it will be construed to do so in the foreseeable future. But the
guarantee can cure these deficiencies, and do so with less doctrinal
discomfiture than would be engendered by such an attempt under
the fourteenth amendment.
To demonstrate the validity of this proposition, resort will be had
to the history of section 4. This will include a survey of the effect
of the fourteenth amendment on its development. Only through
such an analysis can we understand the function of the guarantee,
and the extent to which it still retains the great potential with which
it was invested. For as aptly put by one author, commenting on
the method of constitutional construction often utilized by the
Court:
The original understanding forms the starting link in the chain of con-
tinuity which is a source of the Court's authority, and it is not un-
natural that appeals to it should recur as consistently as they do. Hap-
pily, finding the original understanding . . . is, at best, "not a me-
chanical exercise but a function of statecraft" and of historical insight.9
And what is relevant is not alone the origin of constitutional provi-
sions, but also "the line of their growth," the further links in the chain
of continuity.' 0 This being so and our law not being given to follow-
ing hard and fast theoretical formulaticns on questions of...
[broad scope], it is possible, . . . for historical materials to cast
some light although they are inconclusive and although, in any event,
the clock cannot be turned back.11
And of course, in tracing the "line of a provision's growth," con-
gressional usage should be studied as much as judicial pronounce-
ment, for the legislature is also engaged in making constitutional
law." But the importance of background and subsequent growth
having been demonstrated, care should then be taken to note that
8. One extreme example would be the probable inapplicability of
the fourteenth amendment to a situation where a state's government was
altered to provide that one house of its legislature should be hereditary,
appointive, or have life tenure.
9. Citing FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME
COURT 76 (1938).
10. Citing Mr. Justice Holmes in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S.
604, 610 (1914).
11. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1955).
12. See generally, OGG & RAY, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOvERN-
MENT 39-42 (11th ed. 1956).
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when we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism;
it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and
blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago.13 If by the statement that
what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-
day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution
must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them,
the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such
a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered . . . "We
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."
1 4
The history and development of the guarantee clause must there-
fore be examined in light of both the plan of government of which
it forms a constituent part and the needs of a twentieth century
America.
Such a study reveals the contemporary significance of that pro-
vision. For it demonstrates that despite the growth of federal power
under various sections of our Constitution, only the guarantee
clause can compensate for the deficiencies of the fourteenth amend-
ment. As such, it has a tremendous potential to assure the fuller
realization of our societal goals, chief among which is the protec-
tion and advancement of all citizen's political and civil rights. The
justification for this conclusion will be drawn from a consideration
of the adoption and subsequent history of section 4. The latter
will be examined in light of a growing and amended federal con-
stitution, which orders a progressive and ever changing society.
I. "THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING"
The Federal Constitutional Convention held its first session in
Philadelphia on May 25, 1787. During the next four months, 55
delegates from 12 states, most of whom belonged to the wealthier
and more conservative classes, drafted the fundamental framework
of our nation.' Most of them were in substantial agreement as to
13. Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433
(1920).
14. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43
(1934).
15. See generally, BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1919); FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1913); WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION (1947).
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the ultimate objectives to be sought by their endeavor. They hoped
to create an effective central government, strong enough to deal
both with matters of national concern and with matters beyond
state competence. By the creation of such a government they hoped
to insure stability and order, safeguard the "fundamental rights of
man," and foster economic growth. How to attain this objective was
the problem on which they concentrated.
It was recognized that popular sentiment was in favor of state's
rights, and that therefore their proposals would have little chance
of acceptance unless they were tailored to that philosophy. Accord-
ingly, most of the convention felt that Hamilton's position was too
extreme. He asserted that such an effective national government
was impossible unless state sovereignty was wholly abolished."
What was necessary, the delegates thought, was to devise a federal
system in which sovereignty could be divided between the nation
and the states, with various guarantees and restrictions placed on
each in their own sphere. In this way a compromise was sought to
insure state's rights within a strong national union.
Being convinced that unfettered, majority rule could endanger
property rights and destroy wise and enlightened leadership, the
delegates sought to limit it. They believed that "the evils under
which the U. S. laboured" were due to "the turbulence and follies
of democracy," and that "some check therefore was to be sought
for agst. this tendency of our Governments."' 7 And while their
primary motive was to provide "for the security of private rights,
and the steady dispensation of Justice," an equal concern was di-
rected at protecting "the minority of the opulent against the ma-
jority.' 18
These statements should not be misinterpreted because on the
whole the delegates wished to limit majority rule but not destroy
it. Their fear of popular tyranny or democratic folly did not in-
duce a preference for authoritarian government. On the con-
trary, recent experience with England led to an overwhelming re-
jection of such an alternative. What was needed, they thought, was
a compromise between majority rule and minority rights. With this
general background, a more precise analysis of the adoption of
article IV, section 4, may be attempted.
That the central authority should guarantee to each of the states
a republican form of government 9 seems to have been one of the
16. 1 FARRAND, THE REcoRDs op m FEDERAL CONVENTION 283
(1911) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
17. Id. at 51 (Randolph). See also Gerry to the same effect. Id. at 48.
18. Id. at 134, 431 (Madison).
19. Note the presence of some such provision in every one of the early
and proposed drafts of the Constitution. Id. at 231; 3 FPARAND 56, 630.
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well defined purposes of the convention. This probably resulted
from the absence of a similar guarantee in the Articles of Confeder-
ation, which omission was considered one of its greatest defects.20
Such a provision was also considered essential in that "all the
governments of the states in the Union ought to be of the same na-
ture--of the republican kind; and that the general government
ought to be an assemblage of the spirit and principles of them
all."21
The first measure introduced to implement these convictions
was "that a Republican Government & the territory of each State,
except-in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government &
territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each
State." Soon after, Madison moved to substitute "The republi-
can constitutions and the existing laws of, each state, to be guaran-
teed by the United States." Randolph favored this because he was
convinced that the national union had to be founded on republican
principles, and that no state should be able to become a monar-
chy.2 3
Although the substitution was agreed to, it was followed by a
new resolution, "Resolved that a republican constitution, and its
existing laws, ought to be guarantied to each State by the United
States." Gouvemeur Morris was dissatisfied with this resolution,
commenting that he was unwilling to guarantee the laws of Rhode
Island.2" Mr. Wilson then maintained that its purpose was to se-
cure the states against insurrections and rebellions. But Randolph
insisted that the resolution had two objects. It was directed first
at insuring the maintenance of republican government in every
state, and second, at suppressing domestic commotions. He urged
the necessity of both provisions.
It was then moved to displace the prior measures with " 'the
Constitutional authority of the states shall be guaranteed to them
respectively agst. domestic as well as foreign violence.' "27 Mr.
Houston objected, fearing the perpetuation of existing state con-
stitutions. He noted that Georgia's Constitution was unsatisfactory,
and that there would be difficulties inherent in the Federal Gov-
ernment's intervention between contending parties, each of whom
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 21 (Hamilton).
21. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 126 (1891) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT].
22. 1 FARRAND 22 (Randolph). Similar proposals were made on June
5th and June 11th. Id. at 121, 194, 202.
23. Id. at 206.
24. Id. at 227, 231, 237.
25. 2 FARRAND 47.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 47-48.
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would claim the sanction of the Constitution. Another delegate
then insisted that the national government had to be able to quell
rebellions. If it could not, a tyrant might gain control of one state,
and then seek to subvert all the others, while the central authority
would be "compelled to remain an inactive witness of its own de-
struction."
A motion was then made to amend the suggested substitute
with the words " 'and that no State be at liberty to form any other
than a Republican Govt.' "28 While Madison seconded this mo-
tion, Rutledge felt it unnecessary, since he was convinced that Con-
gress already had the authority to cooperate with the states in sub-
duing any rebellion. Wilson then proposed "as a better expression
of the idea, 'that a Republican form of Governmt. shall be guar-
antied to each State & that each State shall be protected agst. for-
eign & domestic violence.' " This proposal being well received, the
previous proposals were withdrawn, and the substitute adopted. 9
It was then referred to one of the working committees of the con-
vention, the Committee of Detail.
The Committee's notes state that the guarantee was "(1) to pre-
vent the establishment of any government, not republican (2) to
protect each state against internal commotion and (3) against
external invasion."3 It appeared in the Committee's report as,
"The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form
of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign in-
vasions, and, on the application of its Legislature, against domestic
violence."'" Through further committee action, the first clause was
modified to read, "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government. . . ." In that
form, with but minor changes to the later clauses, it was adopted
by the convention for submission to the states.3 2
There was comparatively little discussion of section 4 in the
state conventions. In Massachusetts, however, one of the delegates
questioned the meaning of Congress guaranteeing a republican form
of government. Why didn't they just say outright, he inquired,
that Congress would guarantee the state's constitution? This was
answered by the assertion that Congress only meant to guarantee
a form of government,3" since a guarantee of the states' present
constitutions would be undesirable.34 As actually framed the guar-
28. Id. at 48.
29. Id. at 48-49.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 188.
32. Id. at 662.
33. 2 ELLIOT 101 (Singletary and Thompson).
34. Since it would preclude any future alterations. Id. at 101 (King).
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antee would permit each state to choose such form of republican
government as it deemed best, with Congress insuring its protec-
tion.35
A more detailed explanation was made of the provision in the
North Carolina ratifying convention. James Iredell maintained that
the meaning of the guaranty provided was this: There being thirteen
governments confederated upon a republican principle, it was essen-
tial to the existence and harmony of the confederacy that each should
be a republican government, and that no state should have a right to
establish an aristocracy or monarchy. That clause was therefore in-
serted to prevent any state from establishing any government but a
republican one. Every one must be convinced of the mischief that
would ensue, if any state had a right to change its government to a
monarchy. If a monarchy was established in any one state, it would
endeavor to subvert the freedom of the others, and would, probably,
by degrees succeed in it. . . . It is, then, necessary that the members
of a confederacy should have similar governments. But consistently
with this restriction, the states may make what change in their own
governments they think proper.36
Out of convention, The Federalist papers3" insisted that with-
out the guarantee, "A successful faction may erect a tyranny on
the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally
be afforded by the Union. . ... -" After noting the consequences
that might ensue from its absence, an answer was provided for the
fear that section 4 would permit "officious interference in the do-
mestic concerns of the members."39 It was that the first clause
could be no impediment to reforms of state constitutions by a ma-
jority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would
remain undiminished, for the guarantee could only operate on
changes to be effected by violence. But there was an admission
that it "would be as much directed against the usurpations of
rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition
in the community."40 In the same series of articles, James Madison
also proclaimed:
In a Confederacy founded on republican principle, and composed of
republican members, the superintending Government ought clearly to
35. Id. at 168 (Stillman).
36. 4 ELLIOT 195. James Iredell was soon to become a justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court.
37. These papers had relatively little influence in determining the issue
of ratification. They were a campaign document, written primarily for
New York state, and were therefore probably unduly slanted towards
state's rights. 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONsTrruTIoN 8-11 (1953);
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at x (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 125-26 (Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton).
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid. Hamilton's claim that the guarantee would only apply to
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possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or mon-
archical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may
be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of
each other; and the greater right to insist, that the forms of govern-
ment under which the compact was entered into should be substan-
tially maintained.
But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be
deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments
of dissimilar principles and forms, have been found less adapted to a
Federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature ...
It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a pre-
caution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alteration in
the State Governments, without the concurrence of the States them-
selves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of
the General Government should not be needed, the provision for such
an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But
who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of
particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the
intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question, it
may be answered, that if the General Government should interpose by
virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be of course bound to
pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a
guaranty of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-
existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long
therefore as the existing republican forms are continued by the States,
they are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Whenever the States
may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to
do so ..... .The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall
not exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions: a restriction
which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance. 41
By way of contrast, another staunch federalist maintained that the
guarantee
secures to us the full enjoyment of every thing which freemen hold
dear, and provides for protecting us against every thing which they can
dread ...
Does not the abovementioned section provide for the establishment
of a free government in all the states? And if that freedom is en-
croached upon, will not the constitution be violated? It certainly will;
and its violators be hurled from the seat of power, and arraigned be-
fore a tribunal where impartial justice will no doubt preside, to answer
for their high-handed crime.
42
changes by violence would seem a bit exaggerated especially in light of his
contention that it would operate against the usurpation of rulers. Furth-
ermore, note the strong state's rights audience for which it was written.
See note 37 supra, as well as his own predilection for an extremely strong
central government. See note 16 supra. Note also the specific references
in the Convention to the guarantee of a republican government as a sep-
arable proposition from the guarantee against domestic insurrection. See
notes 26, 30 supra. See also U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 287-88 (Ford ed. 1898) (Madison).
42. Cassius XI, The Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 25, 1787. Printed in
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From the prior discussion of the guarantee's genesis, certain
generalities may tentatively be ventured about the intentions of
those who authored and approved it. Their purpose was to "guar-
antee" to each state, as a separate and independent proposition, a
republican form of government. This was to prevent the creation
by any means, whether peaceful or otherwise, of aristocratic, mon-
archical or despotic state governments. They hoped to achieve this
objective by assuring sufficient national intervention to "guarantee"
state republicanism.
Thus section 4 was to contain three separate and independent
propositions, which, while roughly related to each other, would
stand separately and have independent spheres of application. In
a few instances just noted, this factor was somewhat blurred by a
tendency to discuss all of section 4 as an entity. The weight of the
evidence, however, makes the conclusion reached virtually un-
assailable.
The "founding fathers" insisted on the guarantee clause as a
means of protecting the welfare and safety of the Union. That is,
they deemed substantial uniformity of the states' governments with
each other,43 as well as with the national government, a requisite
to successful union." This notion came from Montesquieu, who
greatly influenced contemporary American political thinking.45 He
maintained that two kinds of governments could not successfully
exist, side by side, in a "confederate republic," and that a confed-
erate government ought, therefore, to be composed of states of
the same type of government, preferably of the republican
kind.4 The republican form of government clause was an at-
tempt to implement this conviction and was viewed as such by its
framers and champions.
With these general conclusions disposed of, a more detailed
analysis of the contemporary meaning and construction of the
guarantee clause will be attempted. What, in precise terms, did the
provision mean? How would the Supreme Court have construed
the clause in the decade after its adoption? Probably the most ef-
FORD, ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 43, 44
(1892).
43. 2 ELLIOT 126; THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 287 (Ford ed. 1898)
(Madison). See also text accompanying notes 35, 41 supra.
44. 2 ELLIOT 126; THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246-47 (Ford ed.
1898) (Madison).
45. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 9 & 43, at 51-52, 287 (Ford ed. 1898) (Ham-
ilton and Madison). Montesquieu's views on this very point are noted in
the former.
46. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT O1 LAWS, Bk. 9, ch. 2, p. 127 (Colonial
Press ed. 1899).
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ficient way to approach this problem is to dissect the clause, word
by word, and apply contemporary materials to their analysis.
The provision's opening, "The United States shall," provides
the only instance where the government by its corporate name is
given a duty. The Court would therefore have been faced with the
question as to which branch or branches of the Federal Govern-
ment were bound to perform its mandate. Obviously the words "The
United States shall" (the word "shall" being mandatory) do not
in themselves designate any particular arm of the government as
the responsible agency. Rather, they intimate that the obligation
rests on all the departments of the government, in their appropriate
spheres.
This conclusion seems especially persuasive when it is recalled
that the guarantee clause was not placed in articles I, HI, or III,
which prescribe the respective powers and duties of each branch
of the government. Instead, it was located in a separate and later
article of the Constitution. This being so, the Supreme Court would
probably have concluded that the judiciary was as fully empowered
to enforce the obligation as was Congress.
The term "guarantee," which describes the national government's
obligation, is not found in legal dictionaries before 1800."7 How-
ever, it is found in the 1786 edition of Dr. Samuel Johnson's "Dic-
tionary of the English Language." "To guarantee" is defined as
"to undertake to secure the performance of any articles." The
word "to secure" is defined as "to make certain, to make safe,
to protect, to put out of hazard." The clause may therefore be
rephrased as, "The United States shall undertake to make cer-
tain, make safe, protect, put out of hazard republican forms of
government in each state."
It is interesting to note that the 1783 edition of Dr. Johnson's
Dictionary defines "to guarantee" as "to undertake to see that stip-
ulations are performed." Because the definition was somewhat
modified between the two editions, it is presumed the change was
made in favor of more accuracy. The later addition of the word
"secure," with its correlative definitions of "making safe and cer-
tain, protecting and putting out of hazard," therefore seems sig-
nificant.
As a result, contemporary usage of the word "guarantee," would
have empowered the United States to take measures that would
protect, as well as restore, republican government. The central au-
thority was not to be a passive observer while a state headed toward
47. COWVELL, LAW DICTIONARY (1727); CUNNINGHAM, LAW DICTION-
ARY (2d ed. 1771); JAcoBs, LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782).
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autocracy. It could take all measures reasonably necessary to avoid
such a catastrophe. Section 4 would thus have sanctioned affirma-
tive national action to organize and preserve republican government.
Other factors militating in favor of this conclusion would have
been persuasive. Could it have rationally been concluded that the
United States was to be a passive observer of state deterioration?
As previously noted, substantive uniformity among the states, and
between them and the national government, was deemed essential
to the Union's safety. Would not it therefore be foolish to have the
superintending power limited so that it could intervene only when
it was too late? And in any obligation to restore, must not there be
implied a power to preserve? This common sense approach, when
combined with the contemporary definition of the term "guaran-
tee," would almost certainly have secured a judicial construction
sanctioning national action to maintain republican government.
But who was the beneficiary of this guarantee? The provision
says "every state." Would a contemporary court have interpreted
this to mean "state government," as opposed to the people in their
individual capacity? The absurdity of such a construction would
have become apparent. For what protection would the state govern-
ment need against its own action? Protection against others is af-
forded by the latter clauses of section 4. To be meaningful, there-
fore, the Court could only have concluded that it was intended as
a guarantee to the people of every state, for only they would bene-
fit by such a provision.
This construction would not only have appealed to the Court's
logic, but also would have been demanded by contemporary usage.
In eighteenth century America, "state" had a variety of meanings.
It could either connote "the territory," "the government," or "the
people" of a nation. Since it was used most frequently as a synonym
for "the people of a state, '48 the Court would naturally have been
predisposed to adopt that meaning in any construction of section
4. When coupled with the fact that the less usual definitions would
have led to an irrational interpretation of the provision, it may be
concluded that they would have been rejected. In this connection,
it should be noted that only eight years after the Constitutional
Convention, Justice Iredell declared that he could not fathom a dis-
tinction between a "state" and its "people."49
A contemporary court would therefore have construed the guar-
antee as imposing an obligation on the United States to protect
48. 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 55-69 (1953). Mr.
Crosskey presents an extended analysis demonstrating this and cites num-
erous sources.
49. Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 93 (1795).
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the people in their individual capacity from unrepublican govern-
ance. And it is unlikely that it would have deemed this obligation
to apply only to a majority, since the framers clearly desired to
protect the minority against the majority, as well as the majority
against the minority. As Madison said in the tenth Federalist:
Give all the power to the many, and they will oppress the few. Give
all the power to the few, and they will oppress the many. Both ought,
therefore, to have the power that each may defend itself against the
other.50
As a result, every individual would be the beneficiary of the guar-
antee. Each would therefore be entitled to its fulfilment, even
against the will of a majority of his fellow citizens.
But was this protection limited to statewide governance only?
Or would it apply as well to local government? A contemporary
court would have realized that an application of the guarantee
clause solely to state government would have been inconsistent with
the mandate of section 4. This is true because section 4 assured the
people that they would be governed in a republican manner.51
And, of course, they are as much subject to the control of local
government in its proper sphere, as they are to state government.
Therefore if the clause was construed solely to apply to statewide
government, it could easily be circumvented by the delegation to
autonomous political subdivisions of plenary state powers.
As a result, the Court would probably have deemed the pro-
vision's protection to extend to local government. For it would
have been both absurd and inconsistent with section 4 to secure
republican governance state wide and, at the same time, permit
despotic rule locally.
A contemporary court would have limited the guarantee's pro-
tection solely to those areas incorporated within the Union. For its
language is clear. It assures republican governance only to those
residing in the states, and not to those living in the territories or
possessions.
The meaning of the word "republican" would have been crucial
to any contemporary judicial analysis of this provision. For in order
to evolve a meaningful construction, its substance had to be clearly
defined.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison).
51. Since "state" meant "people of a state," § 4's language was clearly
applicable to all government, state or local. While no federal court has
held to the contrary, numerous state courts have insisted that the guar-
antee does not apply to political subdivisions such as cities, towns, or
counties. See Annot., 67 A.L.R. 737, 741 (1930); 11 AM. JuR. Constitu-
tional Law § 48 nn.4, 5, 6 (1937); 50 L.R.A. 198; U.S.C.A. CONST. art. 4,
§ 4. These seem almost certainly in error.
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Both during the Constitutional Convention and the debate that
followed, several definitions of the term republican were ven-
tured. It was maintained by some that the fundamental principle
of a republic was that the majority govern and that the minority
comply.52 Patrick Henry was equally convinced that its essence
was the delegation of power to an adequate number of represen-
tatives, with an unimpeded reversion back to the people at short
periods through elections.53 And though some contended that a
republic was a system where the people at large, either collectively
or by representation, formed the legislature, 4 Alexander Hamilton
did not hesitate to remark that those most tenacious of republican-
ism, were as loud as any in denouncing the evils of democracy.5"
Considerable time was spent on the definition of "republican"
in the Federalist. In the tenth Federalist Madison asserts that a
republic is a government in which the scheme of representation
takes place by the delegation of powers to a small number of citi-
zens elected by the rest.56 In Federalist No. 39, he attempts a
more comprehensive definition; he notes specifically that a republic
is
a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good be-
havior. It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a
favored class of it . . . . It is sufficient for such a government, that
the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly,
by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the
tenures just specified . . . . According to the Constitution of every
State in the Union, some or other of the officers of the Government,
are appointed indirectly only by the people.
On comparing the Constitution planned by the Convention, with the
standard here fixed, we perceive at once, that it is, in the most rigid
sense, conformable to it.57
And during the Constitutional Convention, Madison had also re-
marked that the right of suffrage was "one of the fundamental
articles of republican Government," which could as easily be de-
stroyed by limiting those capable of being elected, as those au-
thorized to elect.5" Thomas Jefferson, though not a member of
52. STEINER, CONNECTICUT'S RATIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 51 (1915).
53. 3 ELLIOT 396.
54. 4 ELLIOT 328 (Pinckney).
55. 1 FARND 288.
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (Ford ed. 1898) (Madison).
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246-47 (Ford ed. 1898) (Madison).
58. 2 FARuAm 203, 250.
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the Constitutional Convention, also had some views on this sub-
ject.59 He felt that a republic was a government by its citizens en
masse, acting directly and personally according to rules established
by the majority. Though he maintained that a government was
more or less republican, as it had this ingredient of direct action,
he concluded that the nearest it could be approached in a country
the size of the United States, was by the delegation of power to
representatives chosen by the people. These would serve for such
short times as would ensure their continued obedience to their
masters. Jefferson's conclusion was that governments were repub-
lican to the extent they had this element of popular election and
control.
The 1786 edition of Samuel Johnson's Dictionary defined "Re-
publican" as "Placing the government in the people," and "Re-
publick" as "a state in which the power is lodged in more than
one." The author of the final draft of section 4, envisioned its chief
attributes as the peoples' ownership of ultimate power.6" Also
worthy of note is the fact that during the period after the Con-
stitution's adoption, it was the Republican party that advocated
keeping the government as close to the people as possible. 1
Only ten years after the federal convention, the Supreme Court
maintained that state legislatures were not endowed with absolute
powers. As republican governments they could not pass ex post
facto laws, impair the obligation of contracts, make a man the judge
of his own cause, or take property from A and give it to B.62 The
Court was partially interpreting the word republican in light of
article I, section 10, of the federal constitution. That is, the specific
prohibitions it imposed on the states were construed as republican
requisites to republican government. This, despite the fact that no
such provision existed in the state's own constitution.63
What is even more interesting is the fact that in this case the
Court found the concept of natural justice to be an inherent limita-
tion on all republican government.64 This is attested to by the fact
that no contemporary federal constitutional provision barred a state
from taking A's property and giving it to B, or making a man a
judge of his own cause. The importance of natural justice as a limi-
59. 11 FORD, THE WOKs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 529-33 (1905).
60. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793).
61. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 348(1950); BRINKLEY, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTmS, THEIR HISTORY ch. 4
(1943).
62. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798).
63. Only six states prohibited ex post facto laws. Id. at 389.
64. See also concurring opinion of Judge Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143-44 (1810), for the inherent limitation on
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tation on such government is further illustrated by the Court's in-
sistence that no man could be
compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from
acts which the laws permit .... [For] there are certain vital prin-
ciples in our free Republican governments, which will determine and
over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of [state] legislative pow-
er . . . [such as an effort to] take away that security for personal
liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government
was established.65
Since the concept of natural justice tends to expand and contract
with the era in which one lives, republican government was there-
fore to be defined in light of contemporary values, as well as the
condition of the federal constitution.
The past summary of late eighteenth century thought indicates
the equation of republican government with that which derived its
powers from the will of the people. This would be demonstrated
by their control, possibly immediate, through actual participation,
but more likely remote, through periodically elected representa-
tives chosen by the "great body" of the people.66 Further, such
government was deemed limited, i.e., its powers were circumscribed
by natural justice and fundamental law. Post Revolutionary War
thought would therefore have equated a republic with limited gov-
ernment, governing with the consent of those whose society it order-
ed.
While this generalization would have been an excellent guide,
the Court would have had to devise a more comprehensive and
particularized interpretation. This, to determine the precise limi-
tations and responsibility to which such government had to adhere.
Only then could the Court measure the validity of a particular
facet of state government, or review the legitimacy of congressional
action pursuant to section 4.
A variety of theories might have been considered in evolving a
more detailed picture of "republican" government. High on any
such list would have been a reference to the state governments
republican governments dictated by natural justice. See also text accom-
panying note 86 infra.
65. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). Note that aside
from § 4, no contemporary constitutional provision enforced these limita-
tions on the states. But if they were deemed by the Court as requisites to
"free republican governments" it would most probably have applied them
to the states by virtue of the guarantee's mandate. Also of extreme im-
portance is the Court's clear intimation that all republican government has
an affirmative obligation to protect its citizens' rights from any source of
infringement.
66. Compare notes 54 & 59 with note 53 and THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10
& 39 discussed in text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
528 [Vol. 46:513
ARTICLE IV, SECTION 4
in existence at the time of the Constitution's adoption. Contempo-
rary courts would probably have concluded that they were all con-
sistent with the standard embodied in section 4.6" As a result, as
long as those "republican forms" were maintained, late eighteenth
century courts would almost certainly have found them free from
defect.
During the decade after the Constitution's adoption the Su-
preme Court would, therefore, have solved any question arising un-
der the guarantee clause by resort to contemporary theories of nat-
ural justice, and the condition of the state governments in 1787. So
long as there was substantial conformity to both, a state would
have been deemed republican. This being so, it would be worth-
while to briefly examine post Revolutionary War state govern-
ments.
The governments of all the states were theoretically grounded on
popular sovereignty, i.e., the source of all power was the people,
and the government ruled by their consent. As a result, they were
all limited in their powers. Each recognized that there were cer-
tain fundamental rights upon which no government could trespass.
All therefore had some sort of bill of rights, generally with pro-
visions somewhat similar to many of the first ten amendments to
the federal constitution. These, however, did not preclude the al-
most universal imposition of property, religious, sex or race quali-
fications on holding office or voting. The norm therefore was that
the voters and office holders were the wealthy minority. The nor-
mal organization of the state governments was in three departments,
with an elected bicameral legislature, the basis of whose apportion-
ment varied. Such apportionments were, however, likely to be
grounded on taxable inhabitants, electors, white population, prop-
erty, state subdivisions, or combinations thereof. Governors were
generally elected by the state legislature, but often by the elect-
ors.
68
It would be solely to this standard then, and likely little more,
that the courts or Congress could have forced the states to adhere
to in the decade after the Constitution's adoption. Contemporary
thought was not likely to have deemed the prevailing state govern-
ments unrepublican, and the still living authors of section 4 had
probably not intended to alter them.
67. But see text accompanying notes 25 & 27 supra. Note also that
Wilson, the "framer" of the clause, maintained that Georgia had a re-
publican government. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457(1793). Would the states have ratified a Constitution that altered their gov-
ernment?
68. 1 THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 1776-1850, at 60-100 (1898).
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A contemporary court would have had little difficulty in reject-
ing the contention that a state's government could be aristocratic
in spirit and substance, so long as it was republican in "form."
It would have seemed inconceivable that the provision was in-
tended to impose an obligation solely of sham. What would be
the purpose of a guarantee of mere "form" or structure, if a gov-
ernment's essence could be despotic? The word "form" must there-
fore have been intended to include "substance." It was used in this
clause, as would have been apparent to a court, to mean "kind"
or "sort," rather than "form" as opposed to "substance." Such a
construction would have been clearly warranted, both in terms of
the purpose of section 4, and one of the contemporary definitions
of the word "form."6 9
The analysis of the guarantee clause in light of contemporary
materials demonstrates that it endowed the federal government
with great power which was to be used to preserve republican gov-
ernment. As such, it was the only part of the Constitution that af-
forded the people any general protection against abuses in their
state governance. And as previously noted, such a check in the
hands of the central authority was deemed essential to the con-
tinued welfare of the Union.
Having outlined the origin and intended function of the guar-
antee clause, and its probable contemporaneous construction, an
attempt will be made to trace its subsequent significance in
American history. The culmination of such a survey will reveal the
remaining vitality of this provision in our constitutional jurisprud-
ence.
II. "THE LINE OF ITS GROWTH"
The period of American history from the turn of the century to
the Civil War, a span of about 60 years, was characterized by
relative self-satisfaction due to a steadily expanding economy, an
open frontier, and the slow but sure growth of democracy. As a
result there was little need, or pressure, for the federal government
to protect citizens' rights against abusive state governance. The
temper of the times would have made the exercise of such powers
not only generally unnecessary but also, on the whole, unwelcome.
This picture was appreciably marred only by the increasing
tension over the slavery issue, which manifested itself in a gener-
69. JoHNsoN, DicTioNARY (1786) defined "form" to mean a "particu-
lar model," "stated method," or "prescribed mode." The adoption of the
other contemporary definition, "external appearance, without the essential
qualities, empty show," would have obviously rendered the provision
pointless.
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al struggle over state's rights. Despite this, no branch of the federal
government was forced to assume responsibilities that would have
necessitated its resort to the guarantee. And only rarely was any
appreciable effort expended on an attempt to interpose the central
authority between a state and its citizens, to prevent an alleged
"usurpation of power" or infringement of "rights." But since the
slavery issue engendered the most feelings during this period, it is
not surprising that it furnished the first opportunity for any serious
discussion of section 4. During the debates on Missouri's admission
to the Union,7" battle lines over its free or slave status formed
along divergent interpretations of the guarantee.
The abolitionist segment of Congress felt most strongly that
the existence of slavery in any State is . .. a departure from repub-
lican principles. . . . It cannot be denied that slaves are men, (and
therefore) it follows that they are, in a purely republican government,
born free and are entitled to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 71
They justified their attempt to prohibit slavery in Missouri by
maintaining that the guarantee clause obligated Congress to do
SO.
7 2
The southerners successfully resisted,73 decrying the equation
of slavery with unrepublican government.7 4 They insisted that
section 4 was directed solely against violence and usurpation. 75
As far as they could see, it provided no authority to interfere in
the formation of a state's government, whose prior existence was
presupposed by the guarantee clause.76
These conflicting constructions were refought in Congress sever-
al times before the Civil War, always in the context of the struggle
over slavery. The abolitionists insisted that the guarantee clause
empowered Congress to "dictate the form of [a state's] funda-
mental code or constitution, with a view of rendering it consistent
with . . . [a republican] form of government."77 They were con-
vinced that such a government secured the rights of "life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness," and was founded on the assumption
70. 1818-1821.
71. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1180 (1820) (Fuller). See 35 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1039 (1820) (Clagett); 150 (Morril); 279 (Ruggles); 338 (Roberts).
72. See, e.g., 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 150 (1820) (Morril); as to the obli-
gation of Congress to act.
73. 3 Stat. 645 (1821).
74. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1196 (1820) (Scott); (15th Cong. 2d sess.).
36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1338 (1820) (Rankin); 1028-29 (Reid); 411
(Pinckney).
75. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 413 (1820) (Pinckney).
76. 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1338 (1820) (Rankin).
77. 12 CONG. DEB. 4269 (1836) [covering 1824-1837] (Hard).
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that "all men are created equal," and that "government derives its
just powers from the consent of the governed."7 Therefore, any
government making distinctions between races was unrepublican.79
The southerners, in resisting any such construction of the guar-
antee clause, insisted that republican government meant only self-
government, and that Congress was not empowered to meddle in
the internal affairs of the states."0 As far as they could see, a
state's admission to the Union conclusively established its republi-
canism. From this, they deduced that no later change in its gov-
ernment could make it unrepublican so long as it did not deviate
substantially from state government in 1787.1 Due to the south-
ern dominance of Congress during this period, this view pre-
vailed. As a result, section 4 was never used to safeguard "hu-
man rights" from state or other encroachment., '
One of the earliest and historically most significant judicial
attempts to secure federal protection against abusive state govern-
ance was the 1833 case of Barron v. Baltimore."3 In that suit,
lawyers for the plaintiff attempted to invoke the first eight amend-
ments to the federal constitution as imposing substantive restric-
tions on the states. By this tactic, counsel sought to force the fed-
eral judiciary to save his client from allegedly abusive state gov-
ernance. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall rejected such a role for the
federal government. He maintained:
Had Congress [by enacting the first eight amendments] engaged in
the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the sev-
eral states by affording the people additional protection from the exer-
cise of power by their own governments in matters which concerned
themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and
intelligible language.8 4
Having seemingly precluded any national protection against
state oppression, the Court was to find itself under mounting pres-
78. See 12 CONG. DEB. 4271-72 (1836) [1824-1837] (Hard). See also
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1180 (1820) (Fuller).
79. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1970 (1858) [covering 1833-
1873] (Hale).
80. 12 CONG. DEB. 1055 (1836) [1824-1837] (Morris); 4247-48
(Hamer). CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1858) [1833-1873]
(Brown).
81. 6 Wonxs OF CALHOUN 219, quoted in 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 567 n.1 (4th ed. 1873). As to the first proposition, see
also CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 378 (1845) (Fairfield).
82. See in addition to prior citations, the following congressional discus-
sions of the matter. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1845);
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 525, 572, 987 (1858).
83. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
84. Id. at 249.
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sure for the remainder of the period. As a result, it was impelled
to reaffirm its inability to interfere in such matters via the first
eight amendments. s5 But further than that, it had to face the new
contention that the guarantee clause bestowed such power on the
federal government. While such a view probably had little popu-
lar support, it did have a poorly articulated and somewhat uncer-
tain emergence in the judicial arena as an alternative to Marshall's
position in Barron v. Baltimore.
By 1848, a state supreme court had construed the guarantee
clause as a bar to the use of the initiative and referendum. The
court maintained:
The nature and spirit of our republican form of government; the pur-
pose for which the constitution was formed, which is to protect life,
liberty, reputation and property, and the right of all men to attain ob-
jects suitable to their condition without injury by one to another; to
secure impartial administration of justice; and generally, the peace,
safety and happiness of society, have established limits to the exercise
of legislative power, beyond which it cannot constitutionally pass
. . . . [A]n act is void, if it palpably violates the principles and spirit,
of the constitution, or tends to subvert our republican form of govern-
ment.8 6
The most significant thing about this case was its insistence that
republican government was limited by "the plainest principles of
natural justice." This, of course, was reminiscent of the similar
view espoused by the United States Supreme Court 50 years ear-
lier. As a result it may be a fair assumption that this state court
also viewed the standard imposed by section 4 as dynamic, chang-
ing in accord with contemporary notions of natural justice. How-
ever, what is most significant about this early case, is its insistence
that section 4 was a bar to absolute state power.
Only a year later, the United States Supreme Court entertained
the case of Luther v. Borden,17 which arose out of Dorr's Rebel-
lion of 1841.8 At that time, the 1633 Charter of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations, which provided for extremely limited
suffrage and had "no mode of proceeding . . . by which amend-
ments could be made," was still in force. Disfranchised malcon-
85. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 90-91 (1857); Smith v.
Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 410, 434 (1847).
86. Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 485 (1847).
87. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See HAINES & SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERIcAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-
1864, at 310-17 (1957).
88. For a discussion of this, see MoWRY, THE DoRR WAR (1901); 2




tents, exasperated with this state of affairs and in defiance of the
"Charter Government," took the initiative and elected a constitu-
tional convention by universal manhood suffrage. The convention
drafted the foundation for a new government which was subse-
quently adopted by a majority of the adult male population. Un-
der Governor-elect Dorr, an attempt was made to uphold its au-
thority by force of arms, but after a few skirmishes with the
"Charter Government," the new government was abandoned.
The case which developed out of this incident was an action of
trespass brought by Martin Luther against Luther Borden and
others. The defendants maintained that the "Charter Government"
had declared martial law due to the insurrection just described.
After further alleging that Luther had been involved in the insur-
rection, defendants concluded that as members of the militia they
had rightfully broken into his house to arrest him. Luther answered
by contending that prior to the alleged trespass the "Charter Gov-
ernment," under whose authority Borden had acted, had been
displaced and annulled by the people of Rhode Island. Therefore,
his actions at that time were in support of the lawful authority of
the state, while Borden was in arms against it. 9
Thus, the sole question presented in Luther v. Borden was which
of the two governments was legitimate and lawful.9" The Court
declined to resolve this issue on the ground that it was a political
question and therefore beyond the competence of the judiciary.9'
That holding was grounded on the fact that the latter clauses of
article IV, section 4, and a statute enacted in 1795,92 conferred
on the President exclusive powers in this regard. He was to curb
insurrection by calling forth the militia on application of the prop-
er governmental authority of a state. As a result, the obligation
had been impliedly placed on him to "determine what body of men
constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can
act." While the President never actually summoned the militia, he
did recognize the old governor as the executive power of Rhode
Island. Further, he took measures to send the militia to his aid if
it should be found necessary. "[N]o court of the United States,
with a knowledge of this decision, [the President's recognition of
the old governor] would have been justified in recognizing the
opposing party as the lawful government."9 "
The foregoing detailed and somewhat exhaustive analysis of
89. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34-35.
90. Id. at 38-39, 46.
91. Id. at 46-47.
92. 1 Stat. 424 (1795), 50 U.S.C. § 201; 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 43.
93. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44.
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Luther v. Borden was necessitated by the extremely heavy reliance
placed on it by future cases. They have maintained that it forever
barred the federal judiciary from using the guarantee clause to pro-
tect citizens against unrepublican state governance.
The holding of the case, however, was merely that Congress or
the President had the sole power to determine which of two con-
tending state governments is legitimate. 4 That decision was be-
yond the jurisdiction of the courts, and one by which they were
bound." The notion that Luther held all questions arising under
the guarantee nonjusticiable stems from its unfortunate dicta:
Under . . . [U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4] it rests with Congress to de-
cide what government is the established one in a State. For as the
United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Con-
gress must necessarily decide what government is established in the
State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And
when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted
into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government
under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is
recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is
binding on every other department of the government, and could not
be questioned in a judicial tribunal. It is true that the contest in this
case did not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and
as no senators or representatives were elected under the authority of
the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was not
called upon to decide the controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed
there, and not in the courts. 96
Ostensibly, the Court's motivation for this conclusion, as well as
the case's specific holding, was that
if this Court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry and it
should be decided that the charter government had no legal existence
during the period of time . . . [when it managed the State] if it had
been annulled by the adoption of the opposing government,-[or pre-
sumably had been declared unrepublican], then the laws passed by its
legislature during that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collect-
ed; its salaries and compensation to its officers illegally paid; its public
accounts improperly settled; and the judgments and sentences of its
courts in civil and criminal cases null and void, and the officers who
carried their decisions into operation answerable as trespassers, if not
in some cases as criminals.
94. Luther did not rest on the fact that questions arising under the guar-
antee clause were political. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions In
The Federal Courts, 8 MiNN. L. REV. 485, 507 (1924). Taylor v. Beck-
ham, 178 U.S. 548, 578 (1900), interprets the case's holding in the same
manner as does the text here.
95. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 46.
96. Id. at 42. Cited in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118, 143 (1912), as holding and authority which it was bound to follow.
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When the decision of this court might lead to such results, it be-
comes its duty to examine very carefully its own powers before it
undertakes to exercise jurisdiction.97
Interestingly enough, Daniel Webster, in arguing the case for
Borden, actively urged the Court that Congress had given sanc-
tion to the old "Charter Government" by admitting it to the union.
He insisted that the Constitution was grounded on the theory that
all the states were republican. 8 His apparent description of the
general attributes of such a government were that
the people are the source of all political power, but that as the exer-
cise of governmental powers immediately by the people themselves is
impractical, they must be exercised by representatives of the people;
that the basis of representation is suffrage; that the right of suffrage
must be protected and its exercise prescribed by previous law, and
the results ascertained by some certain rule; that through its regulated
exercise each man's power tells in the constitution of the government
and in the enactment of the laws; that the people limit themselves in
regard to the qualifications of electors and the qualifications of the
elected, and to certain forms for the conduct of elections; that our
liberty is the liberty secured by the regular action of popular power,
taking place and ascertained in accordance with legal and authentic
modes; and that the Constitution and laws do not proceed on the
ground of revolution or any right of revolution, but on the idea of
results achieved by orderly action under the authority of existing gov-
ernments, proceedings outside of which are not contemplated by our
institutions. 99
Not long after Luther, Mr. Justice Curtis remarked that the per-
petuation of republican governments in the states as guaranteed
by article IV was essential to the continued welfare of the na-
tion.1"' Inadvertent as it may have been, this was a harbinger of
the great struggle soon to ensue.
During this period then, from the decade after the Constitu-
tion's adoption to the Civil War, the guarantee was almost totally
disregarded. Though enforced once in a state court, the only last-
ingly significant attention paid it was in Luther's dictum. As prev-
iously noted, this was not unsurprising in light of contemporary
social, economic and political conditions. They conduced to a lack
97. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38-39, quoted in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 144 (1912).
98. 6 WORKS OF WEBSTER 231-32 (1853). Note again in this connection
that the republicanism of Rhode Island was questioned in the Federal Con-
stitutional Convention. See note 25 supra.
99. 6 WORKS OF WEBSTER 217, 221 (1853), quoted in In re Duncan, 139
U.S. 449, 461 (1891); and Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 579 (1900).
100. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 506 (1855) (dissenting
opinion).
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of urgency for any substantial federal intervention on-behalf of citi-
zens suffering from abusive state governance.
Conditions changed, however, as the end of this period ap-
proached. The slavery question, with its concomitant issue of
state's rights, created great pressure for federal intervention in the
previously "internal affairs" of a state. There was a large move-
ment to cure what was deemed a particularly abusive exercise of
state power, i.e., the legal sanctification of slavery. No doubt, also,
that pressure was directed at securing substantive uniformity among
the state governments, since "this government cannot endure per-
manently half slave and half free."''1 1
Not unsurprisingly, however, there was no attempt to force the
judiciary to any determination that the institution of slavery was
unrepublican. °2 First, such a case would have been too politi-
cally charged for the Court to handle. Second, even assuming such
a suit were entertained on the merits, it would have gone the way
of Dred Scott.10 3 That is, the Court, and not solely because of its
membership, would most certainly have deemed slavery "republi-
can." Most persuasive would have been the severe consequences
of the Court's invalidation of an institution coextensive with the
nation's young history, championed and sanctioned by half the
states and their population, and the backbone of a substantial
part of the nation's economy.
Because of these factors it became obvious that a satisfactory
solution of the slavery issue would be difficult to find. It was not
completely unexpected, therefore, when the tensions engendered
by the continual conflict it evoked finally vented themselves in
Civil War. That War not only left great parts of the South battered
and in ruins, but also left it at the mercy of the northern "radical
republicans." Not content with the abolition of slavery by the
thirteenth amendment, 0 4 those men decided to insure the rights
101. BARTLETT, FAMILAR QUOTATIONS 537b (13th ed. 1955) (Speech of
Abraham Lincoln, June 16, 1858). Though in 1787 some states were slave
and some free, this difference in state governance did not become a serious
threat to the Union's safety until the period before the Civil War. As noted
previously, § 4 was intended to secure this substantive uniformity.
102. The political impossibility of any congressional action under this
clause to abolish slavery in the states was obvious.
103. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). That case held
that Negroes were not "people of the United States" and could not claim
the privileges and immunities of such citizens. Therefore, a slave brought
into a free state did not thereby gain his freedom.
104. The Emancipation Proclamation theoretically freed all slaves in the
insurgent states on January 1, 1863. The thirteenth amendment became
effective on December 18, 1865. Substantial uniformity among the states
was therefore achieved by constitutional amendment rather than by resort
to the guarantee clause.
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of the newly freed Negro by reordering the southern governments.
While not adverse to pushing aside legal obstacles, they did seek
refuge for their plan in constitutional dialectics.
The earliest attempt to utilize section 4 as authority to "recon-
struct" the southern states was the Wade-Davis bill of 1864.
Though passed by Congress "to guarantee . . .certain states a
republican form of government," it was never enacted due to a
pocket veto by President Lincoln." 5 It required a majority of a
state's electorate for the legal reconstitution of its government.'
One of the measure's sponsors insisted that the guarantee clause
vests in the Congress of the United States a plenary, supreme, unlimited
political jurisdiction, paramount over courts, subject only to the judg-
ment of the people of the United States, embracing within its scope
every legislative measure necessary and proper to make it effectual;
and what is necessary and proper the Constitution refers in the first
place to our judgment, subject to no revision but that of the people.
It recognizes . .. the judgment of no court....
[The guarantee] places in the hands of Congress the right to say
what is and what is not ... inconsistent .. .with the permanent
continuance of republican government. .. .107
While some people still insisted that slavery and republican gov-
ernment were compatible,1 8 they were now relegated to a min-
ority. 9 And although the Wade-Davis Bill was never enacted
into law, it was the first congressional triumph for an expan-
sive construction of the guarantee clause.
The Wade-Davis Bill was quickly followed by an unsuccessful
attempt to bar Tennessee's readmission to Congress on the grounds
that it had deprived all Negroes of the ballot. The "radicals" were
convinced that "whenever a man and his posterity are forever
disfranchised from all participation in the government, that gov-
ernment is not republican in form.""'  But such failures under
section 4-the Wade-Davis Bill and Tennessee's readmission-
were short lived.
One of the first measures enacted pursuant to the congressional
105. 2 MoRIusoN & CoMMAGER, GRowTH OF THE AMERIcAN REPUB-
Lic 32 (1950); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 82 (1864).
106. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3450 (1864) (Wade). The re-
quirement of only 10% which Lincoln wanted was deemed unrepublican.
107. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 82-83 (1864) (Davis).
108. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 79-80 (1865) (Edgerton);
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2069 (1864) (Kernan).
109. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2104 (1864) (Bout-
well).
110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3976 (1866) (Boutwell). Bout-
well also noted that while universal suffrage was not a requisite of republi-
can government the great majority must have the ballot.
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plan of "reconstruction" was the Civil Rights Bill."' That meas-
ure, originating in the Senate on January 29, 1866, attempted to
prevent any "discrimination in civil rights or immunities . . . on
account of race, color or previous condition of slavery." The bill
was sought to be justified constitutionally by resort to the newly
ratified thirteenth amendment." 2 There was much disagree-
ment on this point, and many people were convinced that Congress
had no power to prevent the states from discriminating against
Negroes."' President Johnson, concurring with this view, vetoed
the bill."' In spite of this, it was subsequently enacted into law.
However, many of the legislators were of the opinion that they
were on shaky ground and therefore demanded a constitutional
amendment that would secure for the Negroes not only civil
rights, but also the franchise. The result was the fourteenth
amendment, proposed to the states on June 13, 1866, but not
ratified until over two years later."' In the interim, on what con-
stitutional basis could past as well as future congressional recon-
struction be grounded?
The guarantee clause had been mentioned previously as a pos-
sible source of congressional power in this area. That it was not
taken too seriously during the brief period after the defeat of the
Wade-Davis Bill is attested to by the primary reliance on the thir-
teenth amendment. The doubts cast on this theory led to a reap-
praisal by the "radical republicans" of the constitutional basis on
which they were proceeding. As a result, when the Committee on
Reconstruction reported out the fourteenth amendment, it resur-
rected their prior reliance on article IV, section 4. It was from that
provision, it concluded, that Congress derived the power to recon-
struct the southern states and assure equal rights for all Negroes.
The Majority Report of the Committee" 6 maintained that it
111. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). For a full discus-
sion of its legislative history see Bickel, The Original Understanding and
the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11-29 (1955).
112. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (Trumbull); 298
(Stewart); 1124 (Cook).
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 477 (Saulsbury); 1120 (Rog-
ers); 1291 (Bingham); 1155 (Eldridge). See also JAMES, THE FRAMING OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 77 (1956).
114. 6 RIcHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 6 (405-11) (1909) (Veto message on the Civil Rights Bill
maintaining its unconstitutionality).
115. CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.A. 45 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office 1953) (ratified July 26, 1868).
116. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 2 Reports of
Committees, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1866) (majority
report). Reported on April 30, 1866, and distributed in full on May 7, 1866.
JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 120, 122 (1956).
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was for Congress, not the President, to establish the relationship of
the southern state governments to the union. This flowed from its
duty to guarantee the several states a republican form of govern-
ment.117 The actions of the President in reorganizing and rec-
ognizing several of the captured insurgent states' governments were
therefore to be viewed as purely provisional. After reiterating that
every state had to be republican, the majority concluded that vir-
tually none of the southern governments could pass muster. As a
result, before those states could be reinstated they would have to
be brought into conformity with the mandate of section 4.
A minority of the Committee filed a dissent in which it main-
tained that the guarantee clause did not empower Congress to
frame a state's constitution. They were convinced that section 4 was
grounded on pre-existing republican government, which was still
in force in the southern states. And, in their view, "to convert an
obligation of guarantee into an authority to interfere in any way in
the formation of the government to be guaranteed, is to do vio-
lence to the language."
But the majority of Congress proceeded on the basis of its own
interpretation and commenced to enact a series of measures pur-
suant to its assumed powers under section 4.118 These acts di-
vided the southern states into five military districts, each captained
by a military commander. He would also control the existing state
governments formed under Presidential order when the states were
captured by federal forces."1 9 In addition, martial law was imposed
and elections by universal male suffrage2 were provided for the
convening of state constitutional conventions. New constitutions,
after being ratified by a majority of those electing the delegates
to the convention, and providing for the continuance of universal
117. "Contemporary constitutional law was all with Congress," in the
dispute as to who should control reconstruction. CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE AND POWERS 324 (1957) citing Luther. Note that unlike the sit-
uation in the Luther case, there was no statute here empowering the Presi-
dent to implement a clause of art. 4, § 4.
118. The so-called "Reconstruction Acts." 14 Stat. 428 (1867), 15 Stat.
2, 30 (1867). The first of these notes states specifically in its preamble that
its purpose is to restore republican government in the insurrectionary states.
Note also the large number of other bills introduced in the 40th Con-
gress, 1st Session (1867), that were specifically denominated as measures
to enforce republican government on the southern states. See CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 1st Sess. Index LVII, CX (1867). Similar bills were introduced
in other sessions.
119. These governments set up under the President's auspices were fair-
ly consistent in most respects with those the states had before the war.
See, e.g., RHODES, ISTORY OF THE U.S. 1866-72, at 11 (1928) as to the
ballot.
120. Except for those disfranchised due to the rebellion, a number which
became quite large.
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suffrage, 1 would be deemed sufficiently republican to entitle
those states to their seats in Congress. However, before they would
be seated they had to ratify the pending fourteenth amendment.2
These statutes were passed over a veto in which President John-
son maintained that rather than guaranteeing republican govern-
ment in those states, Congress was wiping it out.123 And when all
the former confederate states were readmitted to Congress after
conforming to these conditions, they were readmitted with the ex-
press notation that they were now republican in form. 124 At this
time, section 4 was also used to prevent Nebraska from denying
the ballot by reason of race or color." 5
Because of the variety of measures enacted by Congress pursu-
ant to its expansive construction of the guarantee clause, it would
seem worthwhile to examine its philosophy in greater detail. Even
a year prior to the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion, it was insisted that
at the present time, under the words of the Constitution of the United
States declaring that the United States shall guaranty to every State
a republican form of government, it is the bounden duty of the
United States by act of Congress to guaranty complete freedom to
every citizen, and immunity from all oppression, and absolute equality
before the law. No government that does not guaranty these things
can be recognized as republican in form according to the theory of
the Constitution of the United States.. .. 16
After the Committee's Report and during the debates on the Re-
construction Acts themselves, numerous other opinions were ex-
121. In many of the northern states the suffrage base was not yet as
broad as that imposed on the South by these acts.
122. § 5, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). While the two later Reconstruction Acts
modified this scheme somewhat, this was the basic form of what was nam-
ed "Congressional Reconstruction."
123. President Johnson's Veto Message on the first Reconstruction Act,
set out in full in McPHERSON, THE PoLrrICAL ISTORY OF THE U.S.
DUmNG RECONSTRUCTION 166 (1875).
124. 15 Stat. 72, 73 (1868); 16 Stat. 62, 80 (1870). Among the alleged
requisites of republican government imposed on some of the states as a
condition of their readmission was free public schooling for all citizens re-
gardless of race. 16 Stat. 80-81 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1255 (1870) (Morton). See discussions of the guarantee during the de-
bates on the readmission of Mississippi and Virginia. CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1820 (1870).
125. As a condition of her admission as a state. 14 Stat. 391-92 (1867).
That it was imposed under authority thought to derive from the guarantee
clause, see Creswell, CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 57-58(1867). This was before the ratification of the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendments.
126. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1067 (1865) (Sumner). Italics
are Globe's, it indicates a dynamic construction of "republican."
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pressed on the meaning of section 4, and congressional powers
thereunder. While some questioned the constitutionality of the ac-
tion taken under that provision, 27 the overwhelming majority
were convinced of its propriety. They felt that these enactments
insured the restoration of republican constitutions in the southern
states. 2 " And as far as they could see, the means by which they
chose to enforce the guarantee were beyond reproach so long as
their ultimate objectives were proper."'
As to the substance of the republican governments they deem-
ed themselves bound to create, a number sufficient to implement
their conviction insisted that something close to universal suffrage
was a fundamental requisite.' A minority resisted any such
suggestion, contending that consistent with republican principles,
a state could limit suffrage as it pleased.' 3 ' There was also feeling
that a republic required universal public education sufficient to
qualify the people for self-government.'32 And a majority con-
tended that the requisites of republican government were dynamic,
for
definitions advance . .. ITlhe definition of a republican form of
government, which was perhaps contemplated when that clause was
put into the Constitution, is not now regarded as a definition of a re-
publican form of government either in the Constitution or out of it.
[1o have a republican form of government now there must be no
slavery, there must be equal civil rights, there must be protection to
all, there must be no taking of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.13s
127. E.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1333 (1867) (Finck); 1451
(Saulsbury); app. 86 (Rogers).
128. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1207 (1867) (Boutwell); 1364,
1366 (Stewart); 1212 (Bingham); 1173 (Shellabarger).
129. CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1083 (1867) (Lawrence).
130. See Reconstruction Acts and the requirements of universal suf-
frage they imposed, note 118 supra; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 350 (1867) (Broomall); app. 57 (Creswell); 450 (Bingham); 472
(Boutwell); 1290 (Mercur); notes 105 and 110 all considered Negro suf-
frage a minimum requisite, while many went much further.
131. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 507 (1867) (Dawson); CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 81 (1868) (Niblack). 2 STORY, CONSTITU-
TION OF THE U.S. 567-68 n.1 (4th ed. 1873) quoting Reverdy Johnson in
Senate Dec. 14, 1867. (Absent from Globe).
132. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1255 (1867) (Morton); 1253
(Howard); and note 125 supra. Thus intimating that a republican govern-
ment has certain affirmative obligations.
133. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1254 (1870) (Morton). See also
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1290 (1867) (Mercur). The latter noted
that in any construction of the standard imposed by § 4, the "genius, rul-
ing ideas, progress, and existing sentiments of the great masses of the peo-
ple" must be accorded great deference.
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It should be noted that this assertion was reminiscent of many
earlier intimations. For the content of "republican" government
was to be dictated not only by the changed condition of the fed-
eral constitution, but also by the prevailing theories of natural
justice.
A later critic of this view maintained:
What was a republican form of government when the Constitution was
formed would be a republican form of government now, for the Con-
stitution has not changed in that respect. The same meaning that that
provision had when it first went into force is the meaning which it
has now. Subsequent events cannot change that meaning, and there-
fore what was a republican form of government when the Constitution
was adopted by the American people, and went into operation in
1789, is, in contemplation of that instrument, a republican form of
government now. 3 4
However, those of this view were a minority, the bulk of Con-
gress envisioning themselves as acting pursuant to the clause's
mandate. They felt that
by the national Constitution, the nation is bound to assure a republican
government to all the States, thus giving to Congress the plenary pow-
er to fix the definition of such a government; but by the Declaration
of Independence, the fundamental elements of this very definition are
supplied in terms from which there can be no appeal. By this Declara-
tion it is solemnly announced, first, that all men are equal in rights;
and, secondly, that just government stands only on the consent of the
governed .... Whenever Congress is called to maintain a republican
government, it must be according to these universal, irreversible prin-
ciples. The power to maintain necessarily implies all ancillary powers
of prevention and precaution, so that republican government may be
assured. . . . It is for Congress to determine, in its discretion, how
republican government shall be maintained. Whatever it does in this
regard, whether by general law, or by condition or limitation on
States, is plainly constitutional beyond all question. All is in the dis-
cretion of Congress, which may select the "means" by which this great
guarantee shall be performed. 135
As might be expected, legislation born of such sentiment was
soon brought to test in the Supreme Court. In Mississippi v. John-
son,3 " the Court refused to pass on the validity of these enact-
ments, viewing the issue presented as a political question.'37 Re-
134. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1218 (1870) (Thurman); see
also DUNNING, CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. IN CIVIL WAR AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION 122 (1885); 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION OF U.S. 567-68 n.1
(4th ed. 1873), quoting Johnson.
135. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1358 (1870) (Sumner); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (Sumner).
136. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
137. This was dismissed on the grounds that a suit against the President
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membering the Dred Scott decision and its aftermath, the Court
evidently decided that discretion was the better part of valor.
Soon after, however, the case of Texas v. White,"1s gave the
Court an opportunity to comment upon the Reconstruction Acts
vis-d-vis Congress' power under the guarantee clause. In that case,
the provisional government of Texas sought an injunction in the
Supreme Court to repossess certain bonds. The defendant main-
tained that since the plaintiff had severed relations with the
union, it was no longer a state and therefore could not bring suit
in the Supreme Court. The Court held that jurisdiction was pres-
ent because the suit was instituted by the proper authority, and
the rebel states had never left the Union. In doing so, it noted
specifically that it was not pronouncing judgment on the consti-
tutionality of the Reconstruction Acts.1" 9
The Court said, however, that the power to re-establish the
rights of the Confederate states in the Union stemmed from the
guarantee to every state of a republican form of government. 40
Furthermore,
the new freemen necessarily became part of the people, and the peo-
ple still constituted the state .... [A]nd it was the State, thus con-
stituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the constitutional
guaranty....
In the exercise of the power conferred by the guarantee clause, as
in the exercise of every other constitutional power, a discretion in the
choice of means is necessarily allowed. It is essential only that the
means must be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
power conferred, through the restoration of the State to its constitu-
tional relations, under a republican form of government, and that no
acts be done, and no authority exerted, which is either prohibited or
unsanctioned by the Constitution.141
was untenable. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500-501 (1866). That case therefore
did not reflect in any way on the Court's power to review congressional
action pursuant to the guarantee clause. But the second case to attempt to
invalidate the Reconstruction Acts, though nowhere mentioning art. 4, § 4,
did indirectly cast a shadow on the Court's powers to do so. Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868). However, the Georgia case can be
distinguished from most other cases that would arise. The Court never pass-
ed on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 either, though some lower federal
courts upheld it. 2 WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN U.S. HISTORY 600 n.1
(1933).
138. 74U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
139. Id. at731.
140. Id. at 727-28.
141. Id. at 728-29 (dictum). This passage indicates that under this pro-
vision, the United States was to have the power to act affirmatively. The
word "guarantee" conferred broad powers to effectuate the provision's
purposes. DUNNING, CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. IN CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 120 (1885) disagreed, but admitted that the decision in
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), sanctioned it.
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After outlining the steps the President had taken in each state un-
der his powers as Commander in Chief, the Court continued:
But, the power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is pri-
marily a legislative power, and resides in Congress. .... [Quoting
Luther v. Borden.]
... And, we think [that principle] . ..may be applied [here]
. .. though [that principle is] necessarily limited to cases where the
rightful government is thus subverted [by revolutionary violence], or
in imminent danger of being overthrown by an opposing government,
set up by force within the State.142
The action of the President must, therefore, be considered as provi-
sional, and, in that light, it seems to have been regarded by Congress.
... [Congress proceeded] to adopt various measures for reorganiza-
tion and restoration. These measures .. . have been so far carried
into effect, that a majority of the States .. . have been restored to
their constitutional relations, under forms of government, adjudged
to be republican by Congress, through the admission of their "Senators
and Representatives into the councils of the Union."143
This language, as previously noted, was dicta. The strict holding
of this portion of the case was only that a state does not need a
republican form of government in order to maintain suit in the
Supreme Court. 44
The Court's opinion in Texas v. White also casts some light
on the proper construction of the word "state" as it appears in the
first clause of section 4. The Court noted that it is not difficult to
see that in all the senses in which the word is used,
the primary conception is that of a people or community. The people,
[whether dwelling in a particular physical area,] ... and whether
organized under a regular government, [or not,] . .. constitute the
state.
This is undoubtedly the fundamental idea upon which the republican
institutions of our country are established. 145
Thus, while in the Constitution the term "state" is most often used
to express the combined idea of people, territory, and government,
it has been used in this separate and divisible sense. In article IV's
guarantee to the states it was used in the sense of the people as
distinguished from a government. 46
Not long after the Texas case the Supreme Court remarked by
way of dicta that the propriety of the recognition of the recon-
142. In other words in cases where there is no violence Congress does
not have exclusive power.
143. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730-31 (1869) (dictum).
144. See Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts,
8 MINN. L. REV. 508 (1924).
145. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720 (1869).
146. Id. at 721.
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structed governments was a political question. Citing the Luther
decision, it maintained that such a "case is clearly one in which
the judicial is bound to follow the action of the political depart-
ment of the government, and is concluded by it."'14 7
So closes the era of Civil War and congressional reconstruction.
A critic of the role played by the guarantee clause during this pe-
riod maintained:
Never till the days of reconstruction was it suspected that our system
recognized in any power outside the people of a state, the authority to
organize a government for the state. That the judiciary established a
view so entirely repugnant to all established precedent, is significant of
the embarrassments with which eras of political violence must always
surround the department closely bound to the past.14s
But the words of Charles Sumner may be a more lastingly signifi-
cant comment on the provision's growth. He concluded:
It is a clause which is like a sleeping giant in the Constitution, never
until this recent war awakened, but now it comes forward with a
giant's power ... There is no clause which gives to Congress
such supreme power over the States as that clause. 149
Regardless of the possible extremity of such a view, it is clear that
Congress used section 4 to great advantage during Reconstruction.
In appraising the significance of this usage the setting from which it
emerged should not be ignored. By the same token, that setting
should not be allowed to prejudge the issues.
The most impressive thing about congressional usage of the
guarantee clause during "Reconstruction" was its successful ap-
plication as a bar to abusive state governance. It temporarily en-
abled the national government to secure the rights of a large min-
ority and insure responsible state government. The legitimacy of
such action under section 4 seems amply demonstrated by its prior
history. For it was intended to assure that quantum of responsible
government and those rights of our citizens which would be re-
quired by contemporary notions of natural justice. And the fact
that during Reconstruction, Congress may have gone too far in
seeking to achieve these objectives, does not militate against the
significance of its precedent.
The major issue dividing the protagonists over section 4 power
was the content to be accorded the term "republican." That is,
while most contemporaries agreed that the guarantee clause em-
147. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649 (1871) (dictum).
148. DUNNING, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. IN CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 120 (1885).
149. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (Sumner).
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powered Congress to save the people from "unrepublican" govern-
ment, they strongly disagreed on the definition of that term and
the lengths to which Congress could go to correct deficiencies.
The radicals were first disturbed at the institution of slavery.
But they soon found themselves advocating equal political and civil
rights for all citizens as a minimum requisite of republican govern-
ment. They were convinced that if any state were found deficient
in this respect Congress could cure it in any way it chose. On the
other hand, the South, joined by the less radical northerners, in-
sisted that the guarantee imposed no such requirements. They
stressed the condition of the state governments in 1787 as the sole
and unvarying standard by which to test a state's republicanism.
Further, they were convinced that even if a state was defective,
there were limits on the ways Congress could correct it.
As previously noted, however, the southern view was doomed
to defeat in Congress. And the Court, after reaffirming the legisla-
ture's general powers under section 4, and noting that it had dis-
cretion in the choice of the means used to enforce it, studiously
avoided any judgment as to the constitutionality of Reconstruction.
The final appraisal of that issue belonged to history. But the future
potential of this clause as a necessary bulwark against "abusive"
state action was not likely to go unheeded.
However, a new factor was interjected into this scene. It will be
recalled that the fourteenth amendment was ratified too late to
have been of any service during the crucial period of Reconstruc-
tion. One of its purposes was to provide an alternative source of
power for congressional action that seemed somewhat dubious
constitutionally. But when the fourteenth amendment was first pro-
posed to Congress in 1866, the guarantee was "discovered" as a
similar pre-existing source of such authority. Nevertheless, the sub-
sequent ratification of the later amendment was to have a profound
effect on the future development of section 4.111 For that addition
to the Constitution offered the federal government, in relatively
clear and unambiguous terms, much of the power it was thought
to possess under the guarantee clause.
Two eminent historians of our era maintain that the fourteenth
amendment
threw the protection of the Federal Government around the rights of
life, liberty, and property which might be invaded by the states,
[thus] reversing the traditional relationships between these govern-
150. Note also the ratification of the fifteenth amendment on Febru-
ary 3, 1870. CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERI-
CA 47 n.g (1953).
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ments which had from the very beginning distinguished our federal
system.15
1
Though this statement is accurate insofar as it described the de
facto obligations assumed by the national government before the
Civil War, the prior analysis of section 4 would seem to render it
untenable as a matter of constitutional theory. And certainly in the
most important period of Reconstruction, which took place before
the fourteenth amendment's ratification, this statement is inaccu-
rate. For, as we have just noted, the guarantee was used success-
fully to attain much the same ends. Indeed, as a close reading of
that clause would have indicated, it had a broader potential as a
vehicle for securing citizens against abusive state governance than
did the newly ratified proposition.
But the clarity and more particularized language of the four-
teenth amendment, as compared with the more diffuse and gen-
eralized proposition embodied in article IV, was to be the latter's
undoing. For in choosing the provision that would justify federal
protection against abusive state governance, this factor became
crucial.
As a result, during the next 40 years, 1872 to 1912, the repub-
lican form of government clause received a mixed and uncertain
reception. In the first case before the Supreme Court in which sec-
tion 4 was raised as a counter to "abusive state governance," coun-
sel also pleaded the newly ratified fourteenth amendment. With
fresh recollections of recent history, he seems to have been aware
of the partial congruency of the two provisions. Though one pro-
vision was more specific than the other, both seemed directed at
preventing certain abuses in state governance. Being unsure which
was most suited to his purposes, counsel alleged each as a com-
peting alternative.
In this particular case 52 plaintiff brought suit to enforce her
registration as an elector, notwithstanding her sex. After dismiss-
ing her right to such registration under the fourteenth amendment,
the Court went on to consider the allegations under article IV.
Nowhere questioning the justiciability of the issue presented, the
Court concluded that it had to resort elsewhere to ascertain the
meaning of "republican":
The guaranty necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States them-
selves to provide such a government. All the States had governments
when the Constitution was adopted. In all the people participated to
151. 2 MORRISON & COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERiCAN RE-
PUBLIC 40 (1950).
152. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
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some extent, through their representatives elected in the manner spe-
cially provided. These governments the Constitution did not change.
They were accepted precisely as they were, and it is, therefore, to be
presumed that they were such as it was the duty of the States to pro-
vide. Thus we have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in
form, within the meaning of that term as employed in the Constitution.
As has been seen, all the citizens of the States were not invested with
the right of suffrage. In all, save perhaps New Jersey, this right was
only bestowed upon men, and now upon all of them. Under these cir-
cumstances it is certainly now too late to contend that a government
is not republican, within the meaning of this guaranty in the Consti-
tution, because women are not made voters. 15 3
The Court felt this position was reinforced by the fact that none of
the insurgent states readmitted to Congress as republican conferred
the franchise on women. 54
Soon after holding that female disenfranchisement was not pro-
scribed by either the guarantee clause or the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Supreme Court entertained a case where seemingly only
the latter provision had been pleaded.' 5 However, it did note that
"the very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a
right . . . to meet peacefully for consultation in respect to public
affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."' 5 6
Also of particular interest was the characterization by the court
of the fourteenth amendment. It was said to furnish
an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon
the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of
society. . . . [int secures "the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government, unrestrained by established principles of
private rights and distributive justice."' 5 7
Did not congressional Reconstruction under section 4 proceed on
this basis? Further, wasn't this the very theory upon which that
article was inserted into the Constitution? Recall the Supreme
Court's earlier insistence that limitations of natural justice bound
all republican government.
153. Id. at 175-76. Note that the constitution of Wyoming was at-
tacked as unrepublican in 1890, because of its extension of suffrage to
women. 21 CONG. REc. 2666-68, 6582 (1890) (remarks of Representative
Barnes and Senator Morgan).
154. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177 (1875).
155. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
156. Id. at 552 (dictum). Since the Federal Government before the re-
cent growth of the fourteenth amendment could not prevent a state from
infringing such rights, from where did they come if not by analogy to
the first amendment's limitations on the United States? Isn't this an illus-
tration of the Court's tendency to apply contemporary theories of naturaljustice to the word "republican?"--or at least to force the state governments
to adhere to the standards imposed on the United States.
157. 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876).
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This case was followed by a further effort to force the national
government to curb abusive state governance. Again there was
complementary pleading of both the fourteenth amendment and
the guarantee clause. The Court noted that the rights of the
people to choose their own government officials and pass their
own laws through representative legislatures were protected by sec-
tion 4. However, such rights were held not infringed by the state's
determination of the binding effect of its own statutes. 5s
Within a year after that decision, Justice Field dissented from an
opinion sanctioning federal intervention under the fourteenth
amendment, to determine the eligibility of a candidate for office
under a state's constitution.'59 He was convinced that neither that
amendment nor the guarantee clause was sufficient ground for
the general government's interference in such a case. Mr. Justice
Field freely acknowledged, however, that the latter provision au-
thorized the central authority to intervene in the "administration
of the affairs of the State," so far as necessary to secure republi-
can government.
Just three years later, the Court was faced with a suit which
seemed natural, in light of the Reconstruction episode, for the ap-
plication of section 4. Plessy v. Ferguson'60 was an attempt to
void a state's imposition on one class of its citizens, because of
their race, of separate but equal accommodations in transporta-
tion. Counsel for the plaintiff restricted his argument to allega-
tions of invalidity under the fourteenth amendment. His failure to
utilize the guarantee clause was due either to oversight or to a fad-
ing view of that provision in light of the increasing use of the
fourteenth amendment.' 6 '
In a dissent to the majority's view that the fourteenth amend-
ment in no way prohibited segregation, Justice Harlan insisted
that the guarantee clause empowered Congress and the courts to
void any regulation of civil rights on the basis of race. 162 Such a
view lent further credence to the notion that "republican" was to be
construed in light of contemporary theories of natural justice as
well as the present state of the federal constitution.
158. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1891).
159. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 183-84 (1892). The guarantee
clause was seemingly not argued in the case.
160. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
161. Its popularity is attested to by Justice Miller's comment in David-
son v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878). See also 2 WARREN, SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 598-99 (1932). Seventy cases were de-
cided under it between 1873-1888. More significant, 725 cases were de-
cided under it between 1888-1918.
162. 163 U.S. 537, 563-64 (1896).
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In the following years, the Supreme Court held that article IV
did not prevent the people of a state from giving to the courts full
jurisdiction over the setting of municipal boundaries;'63 would not
permit the Supreme Court to review a decision of the highest court
of a state, which sustained the determination of an election contest
made by the general assembly under the authority of the state
constitution;"" did not apply to territories and the conditions im-
posed thereon by Congress; 65 was not, even assuming it applied
to subdivisions of a state, inconsistent with the legislative creation
and alteration of school districts;66 was the full limit of national
control over the internal affairs of a state; 67 could not justify the
limitation of a state's power to subsequently alter the location of
its capital.' 8 In all of these cases where plaintiff was seeking re-
lief from alleged abusive state governance, reliance was primarily
on the fourteenth amendment. Arguments for relief under section
4 were almost always subsidiary, but they were often entertained
on the merits.
The accomplishments of the guarantee from 1872 to 1912 were,
therefore, negligible and unimpressive. It was never successfully
utilized to relieve that which was deemed abusive state govern-
ance. At the same time, the growing popularity of the fourteenth
amendment as a platform from which to demand federal relief was
obliterating any strong initiative on the part of plaintiffs to seek
succor in section 4's broader language. The great accomplishments
of the guarantee during Reconstruction seemed all but forgotten.
And while the new amendment was a somewhat unsuccessful mode
for federal intervention during the early part of this period,'69 its
163. Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897).
164. Taylor v. Beckham, 178 "U.S. 548, 579-80 (1900), relying on the
Luther case. The Taylor case also maintained that the cornerstone of our
republican institutions was the separation of powers doctrine. In 2 CutTis,
HISTORY, OuGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 470 (1858), the
author contends that the Constitution assumes in so many places that the
states will have organized governments with three separate departments
that it must be assumed that their continued existence is a requisite to re-
publican government under art. 4, § 4.
165. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901).
166. Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905).
167. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 454 (1905) (dic-
tum). See also Elder v. Colorado ex rel. Badgley, 204 U.S. 85, 87-88(1907) where the Court did not have to pass on the issue raised under the
guarantee clause although it was argued.
168. In the act admitting it into the Union. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559, 566-68 (1911). The Court also held that Congress did not have this
power under its authority to admit new states. Recall the condition im-
posed on Nebraska's admission pursuant to this clause.
169. Congress ran into difficulty trying to legislate under it. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
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growing success in some areas 170 was further cause for the neglect
of section 4.
But as a protector of most of their political and civil
rights from abusive state action, plaintiffs during this era obtained
relatively little relief from the fourteenth amendment. 7 1 The pres-
sure for federal intervention to secure these rights was so great,
however, that the Supreme Court was continually forced to reas-
sert the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to the states. 72 Only
at the very end of this period was there any indication that the
fourteenth amendment might encompass some of the basic rights
found in the first eight amendments. 73 However, because of its
late arrival, such an indication did not seem too encouraging.
Therefore, despite the growth of the fourteenth amendment, a
broad area for the potential application of the guarantee clause
still existed. The judiciary, by a restrictive interpretation of that
amendment, had limited its utility as a vehicle for federal pro-
tection of civil and political rights. As a result, it could not yet
insure the people, in any substantial fashion, against abusive and
possibly unrepublican state governance.
The guarantee clause, in the exercise of its yet undeveloped and
pre-existing potential, was unscathed by any such judicial sterili-
zation. Reason then might have dictated increasing resort to it, as
the limitations of the fourteenth amendment became apparent. As
has been noted, this was attempted with increasing frequency and
a conspicuous lack of success towards the end of this period. But
compared with the number and magnitude of the failures to ob-
629 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); see also
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), on difficulty with the fifteenth
amendment. Despite its broader and more general language, the guarantee
clause was not argued as a source of congressional authority in any of
these cases. The reason for this, especially in light of the then recent his-
tory, is more than unclear. Some important cases where the fourteenth
amendment was unsuccessfully urged as grounds for federal intervention
against what was deemed abusive state governance were: Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Davidson v. Illinois, 96 U.S. 97 (1878); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162
(1875); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
170. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Chicago, M. St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134
U.S. 418 (1890); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303(1880). The later in the period we go, the more useful and successful it be-
came. See note 161 supra as to the comparative volume of cases.
171. Warren, New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv.
L. REv. 435-53 (1926).
172. There were more than 20 such cases between 1877 and 1907. See
Warren, supra note 171, at 436 & n.10.
173. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
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tain such relief under the fourteenth amendment, the guarantee
clause had not yet been given a chance. The latter's development
into its preordained status as protector of the fundamental rights
of all Americans seemed assured to begin. But a whole world of
judicial embroidery would be needed before the outlines of this
dormant power could emerge.
In 1912, however, in the case of Pacific States Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,'74 the Court provided posterity with a
perfect example of the maxim that "hard cases make bad law."
In 1902 Oregon had amended its constitution to provide for the
initiative and referendum. By resort to the former, a law was en-
acted in 1906 imposing an annual license fee on telephone and
telegraph companies. The Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation refused to comply. It maintained that the adoption
and use of the initiative was unlawful in light of the first clause of
article IV, section 4, and the first section of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' Therefore, it reasoned, any tax enacted thereunder did
not have to be paid. Oregon thereupon commenced suit to enforce
payment of the assessment and the statutory penalties for delin-
quency.
A more detailed analysis of defendants' contentions 7 ' rel'eals
that it urged that the guarantee was directed to the people, and
each citizen, as well as to the states as political entities. It there-
fore prohibited the majority in any state from adopting an unre-
publican constitution. And in the minds of the framers, legisla-
tion by the people directly, in the form of the initiative, was an at-
tribute of pure democracy and not a republic. Those attributes
that they envisioned and perpetuated by the guarantee clause
were three departments of government, with the legislative branch
composed of representatives elected by the people.
The defendant concluded that. the adoption of the initiative was
therefore in violation of section 4, and justified its failure to pay
the annual license fee enacted thereunder. As to the Court's juris-
diction to pass on the issues raised, defendant maintained that the
Court had done so in the past, and the issue presented was justici-
able. Further, the judiciary was not bound by Congress' decision in
the matter, i.e., by its admitting and accrediting Oregon's Sena-
tors and Representatives. The State of Oregon countered to these
assertions by venturing that the question presented was political
174. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
175. The equal protection clause.
176. Major headings of the defendant's brief quoted at 223 U.S. 118,
137-39 & n.1 (1912).
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and, even if it was not, the framers did not intend to exclude direct
legislation by the term "republican.' 177
The Supreme Court responded to these conflicting views after
holding that the arguments advanced under the fourteenth amend-
ment were spurious and that plaintiff's sole objection was really
that voiced under section 4.17' The Court concluded that the is-
sues presented in the case were nonjusticiable, citing Luther v.
Borden as absolutely controlling. 79 It thereby upheld the decision
of the lower court that the corporation's defense was insufficient
as a matter of law, and thus maintained the status quo. Though
the opinion of the Court is replete with statements to the effect
that all questions arising under the guarantee clause are nonjus-
ticiable, its holding may be more narrowly described.
That case held solely that a party could not assail the republi-
canism of a mode of statutory enactment by seeking to resist the
enforcement of an act created thereunder. Stated another way,
the Court will not entertain on the merits any suit where plain-
tiff is seeking to resist a statute's enforcement on the grounds of its
unrepublican enactment. By this view, Pacific Telephone did not
hold that all questions arising under the guarantee clause were
nonjusticiable.
Despite the availability of this narrow construction, subsequent
courts have rejected it. They have maintained that Pacific Tele-
phone bars any resort to the judiciary for relief under the guar-
antee 5s For this reason, a more detailed analysis of the reason-
ing in that case becomes imperative.
The Court commences its discussion by asserting that the at-
tack on the statute there involved proceeded
alone upon the theory that the adoption of the initiative and referen-
dum destroyed all government republican in form in Oregon. This be-
177. Brief for Oregon, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912).
178. 223 U.S. 118, 140 (1912).
179. Id. at 143, 151.
180. Many state courts concur, most of them citing the Pacific Tele-
phone case. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 145 n.69 (1956); 11 AM. JtR.
Constitutional Law § 47 nn.15 & 16 (1937). Other state courts have since
held the provision not violated on its merits. E.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 183
Ga. 189, 188 S.E. 140 (1936); Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168
La. 1006, 123 So. 655 (1929); Frankenstein v. Leonard, 134 Ohio St. 251,
16 N.E.2d 424 (1938); Riggins v. Dist. Ct. of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah
183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935); State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis.
644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953). Even if the Pacific Telephone case would bar
federal courts from enforcing the guarantee, it does not bar state courts
from doing so since the Supreme Court does not control state court juris-
diction. In enforcing it, a state court would be fulfilling the obligation im-
posed on the state to maintain such government. Allyn's Appeal, 81 Conn.
534, 71 Atl. 794 (1909).
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ing so, the contention, if held to be sound, would necessarily affect
the validity, not only of the particular statute which is before us, but
of every other statute passed in Oregon since the adoption of the ini-
tiative and referendum. And indeed the propositions go further than
this, since in their essence they assert that there is no government
function, legislative or judicial, in Oregon, because it cannot be as-
sumed, if the proposition be well founded, that there is at one and
the same time, one and the same government which is republican in
form and not of that character.' s '
This would seem to be a rather inaccurate overstatement of the
defendant corporation's position. It contended not that the initia-
tive destroyed the whole legal government of Oregon, but solely
that the statute sought to be applied to it was void since it was en-
acted in an unrepublican manner.'82 This being so, the conten-
tion, if held to be sound, would necessarily affect the validity only
of that particular statute, the provision by which it was enacted,
and all other statutes enacted pursuant thereto. But it would in no
way affect the validity of other acts of Oregon created in a re-
publican manner.
But this severe consequence itself, if an accurate description of
the results of any declaration of the invalidity of the initiative pro-
vision, might be deemed sufficient to render the question present-
ed nonjusticiable. In the broad sense, this seems to be what was
troubling the Court in Pacific Telephone.8 3 Though only a hand-
ful of statutes could have been affected by a decision on the
merits in that case, some future suit, prosecuted on that case's
authority, might bring drastic consequences. What the Court fear-
ed was a case where the invalidation of a statute on the grounds of
its unrepublican enactment would effectively void all, or a substan-
tial portion, of a state's legislation. The results of such a holding
would produce chaos and the demise of organized government.
That being so, the Court would seem to have been justified in re-
fusing to provide precedent that might lead to such results. By the
very nature of the requested relief in Pacific Telephone, a de-
cision invalidating the initiative provision would have voided all
the statutes enacted thereunder."" For that reason, the holding
of the case can be approved.
181. 223 U.S. 118, 141 (1912).
182. Id. at 137-39.
183. Id. at 141.
184. The Court could have avoided this consequence, however, by void-
ing the challenged mode of enactment prospectively only. This problem
would not have arisen if the suit had been an attempt to enjoin the future
operation of the initiative. In such a case the Court could have given relief




But following that case, one might have thought that the ju-
dicial enforcibility of the guarantee was an open question. Its hold-
ing was rather narrow, and the dangerous situation for judicial
cognizance it presented was rather unique. Not every case attempt-
ing to enforce section 4 would threaten to obliterate all or a sub-
stantial portion of a state's legislation!
Since 1912, however, the Supreme Court has consistently refus-
ed to entertain on the merits any suit seeking to enforce the guar-
antee clause. On the basis of Pacific Telephone, it has denominat-
ed all issues raised under that clause nonjusticiable. This, without
any full consideration of the justification for its action, or possible
distinctions between the case before it and Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph.
So the following challenges to constitutionality, to the extent they
were grounded on the guarantee of republican government, have
been deemed nonjusticiable; an attack on a provision of a state's
constitution permitting voters of a municipality to resort to the
initiative and referendum;" 5 a challenge to a state judicial deci-
sion enjoining state officers from submitting a proposed constitu-
tion to the electors pursuant to an unconstitutional legislative act;8 6
an attack on a statute delegating authority to an inferior court to
form and manage drainage districts;1 7 an attack on a state's
referendum provision;"' a challenge to a state's workmen's com-
pensation act; s9 a challenge to a constitutional provision requir-
ing the concurrence of all but one of the justices on the state su-
preme court to invalidate a statute, (except in affirmation of a
judgment of the court of appeals);:190 an attack on an enactment
imposing taxation for the purpose of supplying free school books
to the children of the state;' 9 ' and an attack on a statute estab-
lishing a state commission to regulate the licensing, sales, prices
and market areas of milk producers.'92 In all these cases assert-
ing the unrepublican nature of the measure challenged, the Court
cited Pacific Telephone as justification for its refusal to pass on
that issue.'93 As recently as 1946, it cited that case for the bald
185. Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 141 (1913); Kiernan
v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151, 163-64 (1912).
186. Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913).
187. O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915).
188. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565, 569-70 (1916).
189. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234-35
(1917).
190. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Met. Park, 281 U.S. 74, 79-80(1930).
191. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374 (1930).
192. Highland Farms Dairy Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
193. Such decisions were accompanied by little if any discussion of the
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proposition that the guarantee of a republican form of government
cannot be enforced in the courts.94
During the period from the Pacific case in 1912 to the present,
the lower federal courts had varying views on section 4.195 How-
ever, none of them made any significant contribution. But worthy
of note by way of considered executive action under the guar-
antee clause was President Roosevelt's brief consideration of
its use to dispose of the Louisiana demagogue Huey Long. He
was dissuaded, however, by the Justice Department's conviction
that the provision was too ambiguous to be useful.'96
In the past 50 years some rather significant developments have
occurred in the growth of the fourteenth amendment which might
partially explain the Court's willingness to relinquish its powers
under section 4. As noted previously, three years before Pacific
Telephone the Court intimated that the fourteenth amendment
might be found to embody some of the guarantees contained in
the Bill of Rights. While plaintiffs before that time were unsuccess-
ful in obtaining any substantial relief from abusive state govern-
ance, this announcement by the Court afforded some encourage-
ment. It was not wholly unjustified. Due to the increasing pres-
sure for federal intervention, the fourteenth amendment experienc-
ed a spectacular growth. It became the primary instrument for na-
tional protection against abusive and unrepublican state govern-
ment.
Thus, as the Court discarded the guarantee clause as judicially
unenforcible, it adopted and expanded the fourteenth amendment
as a vehicle for achieving many of the same ends. Two illustrations
of the great progress made by that provision during this period
seem especially worthy of note. First, most of the important limi-
tations on the federal government found in the Bill of Rights were
incorporated into its due process clause. 97 By that one stroke,,
the Court transformed the fourteenth amendment into a mean-
issue other than the mechanical citation of the Pacific Telephone case
and some of its unilluminating progeny.
194. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
195. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 843 (1948); Keogh v. Neeley, 50 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1931); Hoxie
School Dist. v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956); Butler v.
Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Va. 1951); Oil Workers Int'l Union v.
Elliot, 73 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Tex. 1947). In the Hoxie case the court held
that school directors, threatened with force to compel rescission of their de-
segregation order, were entitled to invoke the guarantee clause and ap-
peal to the federal courts for protection.
196. SCHLESINGER, TE PoLrrics op UPnEAVAL 250 (1960).
197. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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ingful restriction on the states which could be used by the national
authority to limit certain types of abusive state governance. Sec-
ond, the words, "equal protection of the laws," were broadly con-
strued to prohibit numerous kinds of unconscionable discrimina-
tion, including state enforced segregation. 9' The national gov-
ernment was thereby enabled to intervene in the interests of pro-
tecting any person from such abusive governance.
However, in rejecting the guarantee clause as a useful tool, the
Court apparently failed to consider the long term consequences of
its repudiation of that broader provision. For while the fourteenth
amendment has managed to assume most of the burdens of section
4, it has been incapable of assuming them all. This will become
obvious if we briefly review the lessons of history with respect to
the meaning of "republican."
III. WHAT IS "REPUBLICAN"?
Section 4 assures the people of each state that the United States
will guarantee them republican government. However, to further
define the present scope of this obligation, the nature and sub-
stance of such government must be ascertained with some measure
of exactitude.
At this point, it can be safely generalized that historically a re-
publican government was deemed one that rested on the consent
of the people. This consent was evidenced by their participation,
either mediately or remotely, in the control of governmental proc-
esses. Further, such government was considered limited both by
its own terms and by natural justice. In summation, republican
government was viewed by the "founding fathers" as limited gov-
ernment, governing with the consent and control of those whose
society it orders.
But the specific content imparted to these generalizations, as
has been demonstrated by our historical survey, has changed from
era to era. Was this legitimate, or should the specific content en-
forced on the states by the guarantee clause be determined solely
by reference to those particular forms and standards deemed re-
publican in 1787?
There are numerous defects in projecting that picture as the
present standard of republicanism mandated by section 4. Initial-
ly, it cannot be conclusively presumed that all state governments
were "republican" at the time of the Constitution's adoption.'99
And even assuming they were republican at that time, is this suf-
198. Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
199. See text accompanying notes 25 & 27 supra.
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ficient reason to project their image on mid-twentieth century
America? It would seem not, and there are a variety of good
reasons to support this conclusion.
The first relates to one of the purposes of the guarantee clause.
Foremost among its objects was protection of the people from
abusive state governance. Surely the "founding fathers" realized
that government which was sufficiently abusive to be considered
unrepublican in one era might be seen otherwise in another. Is not
the dynamic content of "republican" clear from the fact that such
government was deemed bound by "natural justice"?. 0 The latter
concept is certainly not a static one, but rather tends to expand
and contract through history. Second, is it not clear that the con-
tent of the enforced standard was at least to grow with the chang-
ing spirit of the federal government? The "founding fathers" ap-
parently thought so, as they drafted the guarantee clause to in-
sure a uniformity of governing spirit between the states and the na-
tional government.""
As the historical survey demonstrates, such a dynamic inter-
pretation of the standard embodied in section 4 is certainly not in-
consistent with past judicial and congressional notions. Certainly
the Court is predisposed toward such a construction, since "while
the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing cir-
cumstances of a progressive society for which it was designed
yields new and fuller import to its meaning."2"2 Hence, in accord-
ing specific content to "republican" government, we cannot be
completely bound by the specific "interpretation which the fram-
ers, with the conditions and outlook of their time would have
placed upon it."'20 3
The substance of the obligation imposed by the guarantee must
therefore be viewed not only in light of what the state governments
were in 1787, and what they as well as the federal constitution
have become since, but also in light of current concepts of the re-
lation between the individual and the state, and his "rights" in a
society of "ordered liberty." As a result, no state government can
be deemed republican unless it substantially conforms with con-
temporary notions of "natural justice." This being so, the general
historical mold of a republic as a limited government, resting on
the consent of the people, will be filled by the specific content of
200. See especially notes 62, 64, 65, 86 supra and accompanying text.
201. See note 44 supra.
202. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). Recall especially the general discussion in the introduction
of this article, as well as the text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
203. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934).
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our day. In doing so there will be little regard for the purely form-
alistic or procedural modes utilized at the time the Constitution
was adopted.
A keen sense of contemporary values will therefore be a mini-
mum requisite for the performance of any judicial functions relat-
ing to the guarantee. But because of the historical standard within
which the courts must operate, certain fundamentals will forever
be deemed sacrosanct. Among such eternal requisites of republi-
can government might be some sort of effective elections with a
fairly large group of society participating therein, as well as some
minimum limits on the power to deprive persons of life, liberty,
and property.
Beside these more enduring requirements, others might be
deemed essential in gome eras and nonessential in others. For ex-
ample, universal free public education, not a requisite to such gov-
ernment 150 years ago, must unavoidably be deemed so today.
So also, the general right to choose one's occupation, while now
essential to republican government, might not be 200 years
hence. And of course, the more gradually change is pursued the
more likely it will be deemed consistent with republicanism. Fur-
thermore, regression in some areas, as in the control of the people
over their government through elections, would likely be viewed
with great suspicion.
In summary then, within the limits of the general historical
standard, the specific substance of republican government will be
dictated by contemporary values. Those values will not only in-
clude the present spirit of the national government, but also the
current expectations of the American people. However, before any
attempt is made to ascertain the specific authority which the guar-
antee confers on the federal government, the Court's position with
respect to section 4 should be re-examined.
IV. THE COURT AND THE GUARANTEE
As previously noted, since 1912 the Court has denominated
all issues raised under the guarantee nonjusticiable. This position is
erroneous and should be modified. For in a proper case, no bar-
riers, practical or otherwise, bar the judiciary from assuming its
proper burden of enforcing section 4.
It should be stressed that Pacific Telephone presented an ex-
ceptional situation. In that case defendant sought to resist a stat-
ute on the grounds of its unrepublican enactment. The Court's
refusal of jurisdiction was tied to the severe consequences that
might flow from an adjudication on the merits-the invalidation
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of all or a large part of a state's legislation. But these unusual
dangers were a product of the unique situation presented in
Pacific Telephone. They could not arise, as the following discus-
sion will illustrate, in almost any other kind of suit seeking to en-
force the guarantee.
A judicial challenge to the republicanism of a particular state
act or constitutional provision might be resisted on the grounds
that it would demonstrate the unrepublican nature of the whole
state government. As a result, all its past actions would be void.
But this logic must be rejected, since only the validity of the par-
ticular provision in question will be affected by a successful at-
tempt to enjoin it or defend against its enforcement. The validity
of other state acts would in no way be jeopardized.
But what of the consequences that might flow from an attempt
to enforce the guarantee by resisting all state law on the theory
that a lack of some republican attribute had, rendered the state
and all its prior acts illegitimate? The answer to such fears, how-
ever, is that under the doctrine of de facto government, all of a
state's otherwise valid laws would be enforced. The de facto doc-
trine prevents the illegitimacy of a government from being used
as a defense to the enforcement of its otherwise valid acts.204 Any
fears of this sort expressed in Luther and Pacific Telephone are
therefore groundless and unrealistic.
As this brief discussion demonstrates, the judicial enforcement
of the guarantee clause could not lead to the invalidation of all of a
state's prior acts, except in a case exactly like Pacific Telephone.
As a result, no severe consequences militate against the assumption
by the judiciary of this task. Certainly any inconvenience flow-
ing from the invalidation of specific state acts is no ground for the
Court's abstention here, as such results are indistinguishable from
any other case.
But two other arguments are ventured as justifications for judi-
cial abstinence under section 4. First, that although the Court
might invalidate an unrepublican provision, it could not force its
proper replacement. An extreme illustration of the possible conse-
quences which might flow from such an inability is a judicial dec-
laration of the unrepublican nature of a state's legislature which
204. Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388 (1898); Johnson v. Atlantic, 156
U.S. 618 (1895); Ketchum v. Buckley, 99 U.S. 188 (1879); Horn v. Lock-
hart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873); Cook v. Oliver, 6 Fed. Cas. 412 (No.
3164) (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1870). Acts of the individual seceded states, through
their legislatures, judiciaries, and executives, that were otherwise valid, were




would leave it without a law making body. Since the Court cannot
itself affirmatively create a new one, it is argued that the Court
should abstain in the first instance from any such adjudication.
But that argument fails by its misconstruction of the judicial
process. By its very nature, the judicial process operates in a nega-
tive manner, constantly voiding arrangements that it could not af-
firmatively replace. It contemplates securing positive action from
the parties themselves, or in their default, from the other branches
of the government.
For this reason, judicial invalidation of state acts under section
4 would be no more serious than in other cases. In the previous
example, the President and Congress would be expected to come
to the judiciary's aid if a satisfactory replacement is not made.
And, of course, an attempt to void a legislature as unrepublican is
a most extreme example. In most instances where the judiciary
would be faced with the obligation of preserving republican gov-
ernment, it would be dealing with questions less central to the core
of government function. This being so, the Court's inability to
act affirmatively is no sounder an objection to its enforcement of
the guarantee clause than any other provision of the Constitution.
However, a second objection should be noted. If the clause is
enforcible by all the branches of the government in their respective
spheres, it might be suggested that the judiciary should give con-
clusive weight to Congress' decision in the matter. This, in order
to maintain a consistency of position among the departments and
avoid friction. This logic, however, is not compelling. It is just as
reasonable to assert that on this matter Congress should take its
cues from the courts. Furthermore, no act of Congress can make
constitutional that which is unconstitutional. °5
Congressional approval of state government that is not wholly
republican is therefore not binding on the courts. This, even though
that approval is accomplished by the use of powers exclusively
within the domain of Congress."' For their exercise in no way
precludes the Court from fulfilling its obligations in a particular
case brought before it. As the Supreme Court said in Cohens v.
Virginia:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The
judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it
approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by be-
205. Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527 (1898) (dictum); Gunn v. Barry,
82 U.S. (15 Wail.) 610, 623 (1873) (dictum).
206. Such as the power to seat senators and representatives and the
power to decline the enactment of legislation.
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cause it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties
a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before us.
We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given. .... Questions may oc-
cur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.207
Beside the previous objections to the judicial enforcement of
the guarantee clause, three raison d'etres of political question have
been advanced. s The most usual explanation is that the issue
presented is relegated by the Constitution to the exclusive de-
termination of the political departments. However, neither by lan-
guage nor by implication is this true of questions raised under the
guarantee clause. For its language, "The United States shall," clear-
ly indicates that the burden of its enforcement rests on the whole
federal government.
The second reason usually advanced to justify the denomina-
tion of an issue as political is similarly inapplicable here. It is as-
serted that the Court should refrain from any attempt to resolve
a controversy where it lacks a sufficient standard to arrive at an
appropriate decision. But as prior discussion has demonstrated,
section 4 provides a workable criteria in the substance of the term
"republican" and therefore does not suffer from this infirmity.
The last factor said to render a question political is also inap-
plicable here. Nowhere in the Constitution is there any intimation
that section 4 was to be enforced solely by the electorate. Indeed,
its enforcement by the ballot was just what the framers wished to
avoid, since they desired the guarantee to be mandatory and to
serve as protection against both majority and minority abuse. Any
construction of that provision which rests its enforcement solely in
the hands of a majority of the electorate would therefore be sheer
folly.
Further, it should be recalled that section 4 was intended to
insure substantial uniformity among all the state governments inter
se, and between the states and the federal government. This, be-
cause significant substantive nonconforniLties were deemed danger-
ous to the survival and future of our federal system. Only a con-
struction of section 4 that would enable the Court to enforce the
provision's mandate would be consistent with any absolute deter-
mination to insure the realization of these goals. For while Con-
gress and the electorate could act if they chose, there would be no
207. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821).
208. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts,
8 MINN. L. REv. 485 (1924); POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL




way to force them to meet their responsibility. But historically, a
court could always be made to act in a proper case, thus support-
ing the inference that it was to be able to enforce the guarantee.
And certainly the. Court should exercise that power, since as a
practical matter the clause will never be enforced without its help.
In summary, there would seem to be no justifiable reason for
judicial abstention under section 4 except in cases exactly like
Pacific Telephone. The Court should therefore modify its view and
lend its authority to the guarantee's enforcement. For not only is its
present abstention indefensible, but it effectively deprives numer-
ous Americans of their birthright.
If the Court enforces section 4, it will insure the maintenance
of state government that is consistent with contemporary notions
of republicanism. Therefore, any subsequent enumeration of
Congress' specific powers under that provision will apply with
equal force to the judiciary. That is, in proper cases and by judicial
modes, the Court can force the states to do their duty. Here as
elsewhere, its function would be primarily negative. For example,
on a finding of unrepublicanism, it could void any act attempting
to abolish public schooling, or impose a poll tax. Although most
affirmative action would necessarily be left to Congress, the guar-
antee clause might also enable the judiciary to force state officials
to protect minority rights." 9
However, if the Court adheres to its fifty-year tradition and re-
fuses to enforce the guarantee, will it also abstain from reviewing
congressional action thereunder? It will be recalled that it did so
in two instances after the Civil War.210 But those cases are dis-
tinguishable. They can and should be limited to their facts. 11
For judicial abstinence would give Congress unlimited power to
impose on the states whatever government it deemed republican.
209. In proper cases and appropriate circumstances within judicial
competence. As to the rights which are not covered by the fourteenth
amendment, see text accompanying notes 214-26 infra.
210. See cases cited notes 137 & 138 supra.
211. They arose in the milieu of Reconstruction and therefore involved
unique circumstances not likely to reoccur in American history. Had the
Court rendered an adverse decision on the merits (as it had in Dred
Scott), Congress would probably have impeached the Justices, or emascu-
lated the Court's jurisdiction. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318(1868); SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 324-26
(1954). The Mississippi case can easily be distinguished since it involved a
suit against the President. The Georgia case can be confined to situations
where "abstract questions of political power" and state sovereignty are
sought to be litigated. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 226, 483, 485
(1923) (citing Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868)). No case
besides the Mellon and Stanton cases, have ever even intimated that the
Court would not review congressional action pursuant to art. 4, § 4.
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Not only would such authority spell the complete end of our fed-
eral system, but it would also create an unchecked power capable
of destroying rather than guaranteeing republican government.
For this reason, though the Court might refuse to enforce the
guarantee on its own initiative, it would review the legitimacy of
any congressional attempt to do so. In such a case, it would be
only performing its usual function of keeping the legislature within
those powers actually conferred, the "exclusive" power to enforce
the guarantee remaining with Congress.
This conclusion finds vigorous support from the 1911 case of
Coyle v. Smith," 2 where the Court passed on the right of Con-
gress to impose certain restrictions on an entering state, though
the power to admit new states is exclusively vested in the legis-
lature. It held that although such power belonged to Congress, the
judiciary would review its exercise to insure that it was used
constitutionally. Further, the Court also dismissed on the merits a
contention that Congress could justify the challenged provision
under the guarantee clause, thus providing a precedent directly in
point.213
As a result, any congressional enforcement of the guarantee
clause will be subject to judicial scrutiny. Despite this, that provi-
sion empowers Congress to enact a great deal of needed legisla-
tion from which it would otherwise be barred. The following dis-
cussion will therefore concentrate on its potential powers under
that clause. But one should not forget the equally important func-
tion the Court might perform, if it chose to reverse its ill-advised
abstinence.
V. CONGRESS AND THE GUARANTEE
Despite the tremendous growth of the fourteenth amendment,
Congress has much more power under section 4 to protect Ameri-
cans from abusive governance than it has under other provisions.
For example, it can protect all fundamental rights from infringe-
ment by private parties. Can a state be deemed republican if it does
not safeguard its citizens' rights in fact, as well as law, from the
transgressions of others?1 4 Should not the national government
212. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
213. 221 U.S. 559, 566-68 (1911).
214. The federal government does safeguard its citizens' rights in fact
as well as in law. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1958); REv. STAT. § 1979 (1871),
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). Should not, therefore, the states be forced into
substantive conformity with the federal government as the framers intend-
ed? And see note 65 supra for the Court's view that "free republican gov-
ernments," by definition have an affirmative obligation to protect per-
sonal liberties against encroachment.
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protect Americans against state government that leaves the regula-
tion of their rights to private intimidation? Certainly, in light of
contemporary theories of natural justice as well as public expecta-
tions, such a government must be deemed unrepublican. As a re-
sult, when a state fails in its affirmative duty to adequately protect
these rights, that responsibility devolves on the national govern-
ment. Even before such a failure, Congress would seem warranted
in enacting measures "necessary and proper" to prevent it.215
There are two types of rights which are so fundamental that all
republican states must protect them against private action, both in
fact and in law. In the first group are those rights derived from
the state constitution and laws. So, for example, a state must pro-
tect the following as granted under its law: the right to vote in
state elections, the right to own property, the right to use public
facilities, and the right to public benefits.
The second type of fundamental rights that the state has an af-
firmative duty to safeguard against private action, both in fact and
law, are those without which a person could not live in this so-
ciety. That is, past the implied obligation on the state to keep the
peace, it must insure that each person has access to those things
that are essential to his existence in our culture. Some things nor-
mally left to private control are so touched with a public interest
that it becomes the state's responsibility to see that they are not
used discriminatorily. This, since such use will bar some people
from obtaining access to the requisites of a full life in our society.
And the number of things that are essential to such a full life
grows as our culture becomes more complex.
Equal access for all to housing, employment, education, trans-
portation and numerous other things, when sufficiently touched
with a public interest, must therefore be assured and protected by
the 'state. If it fails to do so, it may be deemed remiss in its obliga-
tion to provide republican government. This being so, Congress
has the power under the guarantee clause to enact all measures
"necessary and proper" to secure these interests, as well as the
rights granted by state constitutions and laws.
In addition to its powers over national elections by virtue of
article I, section 4, Congress may also regulate state elections in
the interest of preserving the republican nature of their govern-
ments. That is, it may legislate to insure that all elections are fairly
held, and that no person is deprived by unrepublican qualifica-
215. As noted in the introduction, the fourteenth amendment would not
seem to go that far, since it requires "state action" for its application and
seems to impose few affirmative duties on the state. See notes 2 & 5
supra.
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tions either of the ballot or of the right to hold office.216 Con-
gress therefore could not only prescribe the minimum requisites of
the balloting procedure, but could also fix the maximum qualifi-
cations for electors.217 The latter power could be used not only
to forestall or abolish particular requirements deemed unrepubli-
can, but also to insure a sufficiently broad based electorate. By
the same token, Congress could wipe out, as unrepublican, mal-
apportionment and gerrymandering, as well as set the maximum
term for public officers.218
Any contention that Congress could not set the qualifications
for state electors must be rejected. That argument stems from ar-
ticle 1, section 2, and the seventeenth amendment. Those provi-
sions set requirements for voting in national elections. They
established identical qualifications for national electors as those
imposed by the states on the electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislature. This being so, it is maintained that the
states were to be left free to fix the latter's qualifications. While
this is true, it in no way conflicts with Congress' power to regu-
late those requirements in the interest of preserving republican
government. The states were given a free hand so long as the
United States found it unnecessary to intervene pursuant to its
duty under article IV.
For this reason, Congress can use the guarantee clause to liber-
alize state voting requirements and thereby insure a broader based
electorate. This is not to say that the "founding fathers" deemed
universal suffrage a requisite of republican government. Far from
it. They considered that a government would still be republican
with a fairly limited and restrictive franchise, and indeed favored
such at that time. They even sought to put popular control as far
away from the governing process as they could. Nevertheless,
it can fairly be inferred that they envisioned that the more popular
control somewhere in the process, the relatively more republican a
government would be.
When this general historical mold is filled with contemporary
notions of "natural justice" and the rights of an individual in a so-
ciety of "ordered liberty," Congress' power to abolish the poll tax
in state elections seems clear. Further, with the addition of the
216. Note that the fourteenth amendment only bars "arbitrary or irra-
tional" qualifications from being imposed, i.e., race or religion, but not, for
example, property, residence, or educational qualifications. See Breedlove
v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
217. Accord, CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 523 (1953).
218. While the fourteenth amendment might apply to malapportionment,
it would not apply to unconscionably long terms of office for some state
officials. See note 8 supra.
1962] 567
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
strong presumption that should exist in favor of any congressional
action enforcing the guarantee,219 there should be little doubt
that it could also enact maximum qualifications for state elec-
tors.22 Such action would seem consistent with its encourage-
ment of one of the concepts on which republican government
rests-government by the consent of the governed. Also, by
standardizing the qualifications needed to vote, Congress would be
advancing the general purpose of the framers which was to se-
cure substantial substantive uniformity among the state govern-
ments.
It might be contended that Congress could force the states to
recognize all those rights enumerated in the Constitution that are
not secured against their action by the fourteenth amendment.
Among the most important of those would be the right to refrain
from testifying against oneself in a criminal prosecution,22' the
right to trial by jury in all criminal cases according to common
law, 2 the right to reasonable bail,22 and the right to be in-
dicted by a grand jury.224 Admittedly, the fourteenth amend-
ment substantively places on the states most of the civil rights re-
strictions that are placed on the federal government. 25 In doing
so, it is performing the function that probably would have accrued
to the guarantee clause had the fourteenth amendment not been
enacted. This, because the earlier provision was intended to secure
citizens from abusive, hence unrepublican, state governance.
Equally as important, it was to exact from the state governments
substantial conformity to the spirit of the national authority. There-
fore, as the federal constitution was amended to protect the citizen
against certain types of abusive national action, the guarantee cor-
respondingly redefined the limitations on the states. And had the
fourteenth amendment not been enacted, these limitations would
have been raised successfully against state government by virtue
of section 4. But that amendment made this unnecessary.
219. In addition to the usual presumption in favor of constitutionality,
Congress might benefit in any test of its actions under § 4 from a further
presumption grounded on its exclusive right to enforce that provision.
The presumption created is, of course, rebuttable.
220. And thereby even modify or abolish residence or educational re-
quirements in the interest of securing a broader based and hence more
"republican" electorate.
221. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
222. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937) (cases cited).
223. See, e.g., CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1133 n.1 (1953).
224. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Gaines v. Washington,
277 U.S. 81, 86 (1928).
225. For those rights, and the cases, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 324 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 84-85 (1947).
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The remaining question, therefore, is whether those limitations
on the federal government which are not applied to the states by
the fourteenth amendment are of sufficient import to be regarded
as essential to republican government? There would seem to be a
presumption that they are only procedural and of a formalistic
and insignificant nature. This results from the fact that the later
amendment imposes on the states all of the restrictions that bind
national action, save those that
are nort of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish
them is not to violate a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people, as to be ranked as fundamental. . ....
[And all those that are imposed are done so] in the belief that nei-
ther liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. 226
This being so, the failure of the states to observe such limita-
tions as inhere in the Bill of Rights, but which are not substan-
tively applied to them, cannot be deemed unrepublican. For those
restrictions are not so fundamental as to inhere in the very nature
of republican government. The lesson to be learned is that the
fourteenth amendment doomed the future growth of the guar-
antee clause as a mode of applying to the states the important sub-
stantive restrictions on national action.
But it is still obvious, as the prior discussion well illustrates,
that a substantial residium of power inheres in the central govern-
ment under the guarantee clause. For that clause places on the na-
tional government certain obligations which are not imposed by
other parts of our fundamental law. More specifically, it obliges
the federal government to use its authority to secure for all Ameri-
cans a fuller realization of their political and civil rights. For only
by the adequate protection and advancement of these rights can
republican state government be achieved or preserved. The only
force in our system capable of realizing this objective is the na-
tional governmenf. Small wonder then, that the guarantee endowed
it with such power.
VI. THE GUARANTEE AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
What would be the impact on our federal system of such a con-
scientious enforcement of the guarantee? Would we destroy the
virtues of federalism? Cure its evils? Would such an enforcement
move us towards a unitary state?
The virtues of our federal system are deemed numerous. It is
said that composed of relatively autonomous units, the federal
226. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
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system is valuable as a safeguard against possible coups d'etat,
as a quarantine against sociological diseases, and as a device for
separating local from national political issues which are better
considered apart. Such a system also permits administration on a
more workable scale, adaption of legislation and regulation to lo-
cal needs, creation of laboratories for social experimentation, and
the training of the populace in self-government on a more im-
mediate and understandable basis.227
This superficial summary of some of the alleged benefits of fed-
eralism is not meant to provide anything more than a brief sy-
nopsis upon which to base the following discussion. What would a
rigorous and expansive enforcement of section 4 do to the posi-
tive values inherent in our federal system?
The short answer would seem to be that it would impair them
only slightly, if at all. This, because section 4 can only be used to
safeguard those fundamental values that we deem too important
to be left to the whim of the various states. Admittedly these
values have grown both in number and scope. As a result, the na-
tional authority might interfere a great deal in the internal govern-
ance of the states.
But as was noted earlier, such intervention would be warranted
solely to protect citizens' rights, and maintain that degree of lim-
ited self-government that contemporary society demands. The states
therefore continue sovereign in their respective spheres so long as
they do not impinge on the substance of those overriding values.
This being so, it is hard to see how the virtues of a federal system
would be injured by a rigorous enforcement of section 4. Surely
they would be circumscribed, but only by the advancement of
those values deemed too important to be left to local determina-
tion. Such advancement in nowise spells the demise of state gov-
ernment. The states would still be self-governing autonomous units,
handling local problems, and supreme in their own sphere. The
fact that an enforcement of the guarantee might restrict their ac-
tion in some areas would seem no more destructive of the federal
system's positive values than are the limitations imposed by the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Can they too be said to de-
stroy the virtues of federal government? Or do they, as well as
the guarantee, preserve and advance such virtues, save under
those limitations we deem so essential that no state ought to
have the power to infringe them?
The net result of a constitutional exercise of section 4 power
would be more vibrant and effective state government, with an
227. BENSON, THE NEW CENTRALIZATION 21 (1941).
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intensifying of the values to be derived therefrom. This, because
the more responsible and representative a state government be-
comes, the more it fulfills the expectations of the federal system.
National intervention to secure these objectives would bolster the
ability of local government to ascertain, and thereby insure, the
advancement and protection of permissible local values.228 It
would also assure better handling and resolution of state problems
through a more adequate expression of local opinion and feeling.
And it might conduce to a greater feeling of unity and content-
ment with state government, thereby strengthening it as a bulwark
against federal usurpation and the dangers of autocracy. Fur-
ther, national intervention could secure broader popular consent,
or at least acceptance of social experimentation undertaken by the
state, as well as provide more of the people with a first hand op-
portunity to gain a meaningful participation in government. Such
broad based local control as would result from an enforcement
of the guarantee might also foster a desire in the mass of the peo-
ple to have local problems administered locally, instead of giving
them up to the national government where their control would
be more remote.
It is difficult to conceive of injury resulting from federal protec-
tion of individual rights which are deemed basic to republican
government. The states' capacity to function in those areas deemed
by our federal system properly within their unreviewable aegis
would in no way be weakened. To argue that such federal action
would encroach on areas of traditional "state's rights," is only to
highlight the inescapable fact that a federal union involves a deli-
cate balance which is ever in a flux and process of adjustment. A
conscientious and rigorous enforcement of the guarantee would
not destroy federalism and its attendant virtues, but only adjust
the delicate balance of powers that any such system involves. And
that adjustment, by virtue of an enforcement of section 4, would
solely be one of recognizing the paramount national concern with
certain matters, and the attendant power of the federal govern-
ment to deal with them.
It would therefore seem extremely desirable to resurrect the
guarantee as an instrument of national government. The salutary
results that could be obtained from an application of its principles
would greatly enhance the solution of many contemporary prob-
lems. Most of all, by curing the deficiencies of the fourteenth
amendment, it would insure the fuller realization for all Ameri-
228. Racial and religious discrimination are obviously not "permissible
local values," as attested to by the spirit of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments.
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cans of those basic precepts upon which our society rests. In the
words of the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed....
